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Abstract
Problem:
There has been much talk over the past 50 years of the role of
American labor in a changing American industrial market. As the world has
become increasingly connected, American workers who tout high levels of
labor rights, high wages, and safe working conditions have been hard pressed
to compete with emerging economies that often share little of these same
principles or legal decrees.
The debate over American competitiveness in the world has been
fought on the picket lines, on the streets, in back rooms and most importantly
in the stolid, white, columned halls of Congress. While liberalized trade was
supported in Congressional platforms in the post-war period, this stance has
undergone a dramatic change toward protectionism. With changing
constituencies and increased globalization, the question remains as to what
course on trade the American government will support, and in particular if the
Democratic Party will continue down a path toward protectionism.
Methodology:
This study is the culmination of more than a year of research which
began during my internship with the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, DC. I have sought to use a wide variety of sources and types of
media, ranging from websites and working papers to interviews and
textbooks. My goal was to present an impartial presentation of the Democratic
Party’s change in support on trade starting in the 1930s and progressing
throughout the century. I separated the work into sections which isolate the
most interesting and dynamic periods in international trade.
A large majority of the information which is presented in this paper is
derived from I.M. Destler’s book, American Trade Politics, which is widely
considered to be one of the most comprehensive and well-written books on the
history of trade and trade policy.
Argument:
My argument in this paper is that the Democratic Party has undergone
a dramatic change on trade policy, from supporting a liberalized framework to
being an incubator of protectionist sentiment, based on the influence of certain
trade industries and, most importantly, labor unions.
Conclusion:
The Democratic Party has been influenced by changing constituencies
into supporting a more protectionist platform. While Democrats had a
stronghold in the South, the movement of the party to the Northern states
forced Democrats to support trade which protected American manufacturing.
The effects of the 2006 and 2008 elections have built a Democratic platform
that is increasingly protectionist and supportive of Fair Trade and labor rights.
I have shown that this change is due to labor union pressure and the increasing
vulnerability of American manufacturing.
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Changing Constituencies and International Trade: The Role of
Organized Labor on the Trade Platform of the Democratic Party
By Chad Brooker
I.

Introduction
There has been much talk over the past 50 years about the role of

American labor in a changing American industrial market, specifically in
trade competitiveness and increasing labor rights. As the world has become
increasingly connected, American workers, who tout high levels of labor
rights, high wages, and safer working conditions than the majority of workers
in the world’s other countries, have been hard pressed to compete with
emerging economies that often share little of these same principles or legal
foundations of support. Workers rights have become an increasingly important
topic for American labor since the birth of the movement in the early 1900s1.
The debate over American competitiveness has been fought on the picket
lines, on the streets, in backrooms and most importantly, in the stolid, white
columned halls of Congress. Liberalized trade has always been a tough sell
within Congress and the public, however, the prosperity and American
Exceptionalism that it fostered for much of the 20th Century allowed it to be
championed in Congressional platforms throughout and just prior to the postwar period. However, this stance has suffered a slow degradation during the
second half of the century as the once untouchable American manufacturing
1

While the workers’ rights movement began far earlier and in some cases and in some
industries reaches back to the 1600s and early 1700s, the real growth in reform and true
amendments to the legal foundations of labor right did not fully develop until the late 1800s
and early 1900s. This era is marked by literary works such as Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and
other progressive pieces of literature which shed light on the poor, dangerous and unclean
conditions in many of America’s factories.
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began to face increasingly strong foreign competition—the pace of this rebirth
of mainstream-supported protectionism rapidly quickened as the century came
to a close.
Since the late 1970s, labor unions have become increasingly vocal
about the welfare of their members in relation to increasing global
competition. While these unions represent a fraction of the workforce that
they once did, they learned that with decreasing membership, they needed to
speak louder to be heard. The percentage of the workforce that is under labor
union representation has dropped to increasingly smaller levels. Between 1962
and 2009, labor union representation fell from 35% of all full time employees
in the United States to a staggeringly low of 15%; the rate falls to 13.6% when
analyzing union membership.23 When the values for private sector employees
versus public sector membership is included, it becomes clearer that while
public sector union membership has slipped more slowly, private sector
membership has plummeted. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
“Current Population Survey”, only 7.2% of private sector employees are
members of unions, compared with 37.4% of public sector membership.4
However, with the increasing trade, political and legal roles that labor
unions play in the American system, the unions have successfully hidden their
sliding number of members. Starting in the 1960s with skepticism about the
effects of the Kennedy Round, labor unions laid their foundations of
opposition to free trade and became proponents of “Fair Trade” legislation.
2

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010
Barenburg, 2009
4
Kleiner, 2001; BLS. 2010
3
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This opposition led to the first wave of worker compensation benefits, known
as Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), ushering in a new wave of
protectionist policies in select industries. The labor union battles quickened
pace in the 1970s and 1980s as international competition began to truly
threaten the livelihoods of millions of American manufacturers. With the birth
of the 1990s, organized labor would be a formidable force in international
trade legislation. By this time, unions were capable of not only influencing
policy, but of controlling legislators and even constructing the means to
heavily influence elections and the electoral platforms of primarily
Democrats, but, as will be seen in the 2006 and 2008 electoral cycles,
Republicans as well. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
debates in the early 90s, and increasingly over the course of this decade with
the Bush FTAs, labor has turned up the bullhorn and the speed on the printing
press as they churn out propaganda and campaign pressure on both
incumbents and challengers. The pressure from labor unions and
manufacturing state representatives has kept the “fair trade” vs. “free trade”
debate at the forefront of every legislature.
With the 2006 and 2008 elections, the slowing economy eventually
leading to the great collapse starting in late 2007, and the rapidly declining
employment in American manufacturing caused international trade and labor
laws to become not just an important factor in the elections. In some races it
was a central issue. International labor rights and organized labor in America
have found central allies in legislators, particularly those from the Democratic
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Party, building from the dissatisfaction in and around the NAFTA movement
and continuing through the “dark years” of Republican governmental control.
II.

The Players: The Cases for Organized Labor and Free Traders
Labor unions have long been vilified by business interests.

Organizations such as the US Chamber of Commerce and United Association
of Manufacturers, and many other pro-business outfits across the country have
claimed that organized labor is mucking up the works and is defending
inefficient, non-competitive employment as a protectionist way to stop
outsourcing and protect the American jobs which form their ranks. While
speaking from a purely economic stance, this may have some merit in terms of
being non-competitive in some industrial sectors, however much of their
wishes to maintain competitiveness emerge from the true levels of efficiency
and productivity. In order to understand labor’s argument and why business
groups feel otherwise, it is important to look at each side and break down the
complex economic and political connotations that are providing the
foundation for this heated debate — a debate which is not uncommon across
the highly developed world.
A. The Case for Organized Labor
American labor is well known for its quality, its efficiency, and its
unparalleled productivity. However, as a group, it has been slipping in both
power and size due to the emergence of an increasingly globalized world. It is
difficult for American labor to be able to compete with what is often called a
global “race to the bottom” where profit-seeking companies are willing to
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move operations around the globe in an effort to minimize production costs
and offer cheaper and cheaper goods to voracious world consumers. As will
be seen when analyzing the Stolper-Samuelson model, the constantly
increasing power of outsourcing, the vast growth in international trade, and
the almost liquid international capital mobility5, is almost ubiquitously helping
highly-educated, white-collar workers while eroding American
manufacturing. Due to the unequal effects of trade, the complaints of
American labor are justified.
In order to analyze the case for labor, it is important to understand the
major reasons why labor unions have been so adamant about their inclusion in
all current and future trade agreements. The main reasons seem to be more
than obvious, as the economic situation of the American blue-collar worker
has slipped down an increasingly steep slope. However, there are many
factors, some less connected to economics than others.
Increased international trade has not only threatened American
worker’s pockets, but has put them at a disadvantage in terms of crude
manufacturing to much of the developing world. “U.S. exports to China in
2001 supported 166,200 jobs, but U.S. imports displaced production that
would have supported 1,188,200 jobs. Therefore, the $84 billion trade deficit
in 2001 displaced 1,022,000 jobs in that year. Job displacement rose to

5

It should be noted that there is strong if not almost total capital mobility in the current era
under normal economic periods in a positive business cycles, when the world’s economies are
experiencing strong positive growth, as was the case for the majority of the past decade, save
the recession in 2001 and the global crisis to end the decade. The past three years since the
official start of the global economic recession in late 2007 has shown global financial outfits
that capital liquidity is not a guarantee in the modern world.
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3,349,300 jobs in 2007 and 3,440,700 jobs in 2008.”6 Organized labor is quick
to point out that more must be done to protect their place in the American
labor market.
Consumers in developed countries stand willing to pay a little more for
their goods if there could be a guarantee that the goods were produced under
fair labor conditions. This is a beacon of hope for the unions who struggle to
show the well lined pockets of Congress that labor rights are a popular idea.
While politicians have consistently selected from American-made products
such as hats, shirts and other campaign memorabilia, the mainstream
consumer has long been assumed to only be interested in minimizing costs
and care little about the processes and production but only about the price
versus the quality perceived. Unions have long tried to show politicians that
extending labor rights to trading partners is more than a wish to protect the
American consumer but is in fact marketable, both on the product shelves and
on the campaign trail.
A number of surveys have been conducted that ask consumers if they
were willing to pay more to guarantee safe working environments and fair
labor standards for the workers who produced the good. Marymount
University’s Center for Ethical Concerns, the University of Maryland, and the
National Bureau of Economic Research produced three major surveys in 1999
(Marymount conducted the same survey in 1995 and 1996 as well) looking
into consumer opinions relating to purchasing ethically produced goods. In the
Marymount survey, it asked “Would you avoid shopping at a retailer that sold
6

“Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs” Robert E. Scott. March 23, 2010. EPI
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garments made in a sweatshop?” to which, 78%, 79% and 75% of respondents
answered in the affirmative against the sweatshops in 1995, 1996, and 1999
respectively. In terms of compensation, 84%, 83% and 86% respectively were
willing to, “pay $1 more for a $20 garment guaranteed made under good
conditions.”7
Respondents to the University of Maryland’s questions were even
more generous, with 76% of respondents saying that they were “willing to pay
$25 for a $20 garment that is certified to have not been made in a sweatshop.”
Eighty-two percent in the same survey responded that they “Do not expect
workers in foreign countries to make U.S. wages, but expect countries to
permit wages to rise by allowing unions and/or stopping child labor.”8
All of these responses were corroborated in the survey conducted by
the National Bureau of Economic Research which asked fewer closed-ended
questions. It found that consumers were willing to pay $2.80 on a $10 item
and $15 on a $100 item if it was made under fair working conditions. In
addition, it discovered that consumers would expect a decreased price if they
were going to purchase a shirt made under poor conditions, demanding on
average a $4.30 discount for the shirt.9 However, with all of these responses, it
still remains easier to elicit positive ideas toward extending labor rights when
referencing child labor than when speaking about union violence and
blockades.

7

Marymount University Center for Ethical Concerns, 1999
University of Maryland, 2000; Elliot, 2003, p. 31
9
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000; Eliot, 2003, p.31
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While the vast majority of Americans benefit from trade, those who
lose out are more often than not those can least afford to be effected, are the
most disadvantaged, least educated, and often among the lower income
brackets. The disproportionate effects have been catastrophic on equality and
especially the already growing income gap. The income gap in the United
States has grown exponentially over this century, the most prominent
increases since the 1920s coming within the past 30 years.
The issue has never been worse than today though. Currently, in the
United States, the top 1% of Americans has an average income of $1.27
million and represents 23% of the nation’s income. The top 10% makes up a
monumental 49% of all national income.10 More worrisome is the effect on
the lower classes over the past three decades. In the last 25 years, the income
share of the bottom 80% of the population has been depressed by 7%,
meaning that the income share of the poorest Americans — those most likely
to be working in highly labor intensive industries like manufacturing and
industrial — has dropped relative to the higher classes.11 Labor unions,
activists, and “fair trade” legislators alike are thus supported in their disgust
that in the most wealthy country in the world, 36.5 million people live in
poverty and another 57 million have family incomes between $27,000 and
$47,000, putting them in the “near poor” category.12
This is occurring at the same time as workers bargaining power is
being eroded though the reduction in union involvement. When compared to
10

Bivens, 2007
Barenburg, 2009.
12
United States Census Bureau, 2010
11

9
national income, corporate profits reached a 56-year high and average wage
has barely risen and income for a male worker in their 30s has dropped. The
median hourly inflation adjusted wage rose very little — from $13.90 per hour
in 1973 to $15.11 in 2007. At the same time, the average annual inflation
adjusted income fell from $40,210 twenty-five years ago to $35,010 in 2009.13
This means that Americans today, on average, feel poorer than they did over a
quarter century ago due to this meager wage increase simultaneous to inflation
being a constant factor. Using the inflation figures from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the average wage figures from above, it can be calculated
that between 1975 and 2007 the average wage increased by $.05/hour per year
at the same time as the positive inflation devalued this wage by an outstanding
$.61/hour per year.14 This means that the forces of inflation pulling down on
the value of the wages of the average American worker has been over twelve
times as powerful as the forces, such as labor unions, that apply upward
pressure on the wage.

13
14

US Census Bureau, 2010; Bivens, 2007
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010; Bivens, 2007
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Organized labor is even more worried about the declining ratio
Gross Domestic Product Per Employed Person, 2008

between labor productivity and wages. The American worker has long been
considered the most productive unit in the world, and even to this day, it is not
uncommon to find statistics showing that American labor productivity
supersedes all other countries. Shown below is the labor productivity in 2008
among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and The World Bank.15 In
economic terms, labor productivity is defined as a country’s GDP divided by
the aggregate number of persons employed. With this in mind, it makes the
fact that the United States is number two even more important since the
United States boasts the third largest population in the world. According to the
15

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010b
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U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of May 2010, there were 139.42 million
Americans employed, representing 58.7% of the national population.16
Americans have for much of the past century, particularly in the post
Second World War period, enjoyed a level of compensation which not only
kept pace with labor productivity, but in fact as can be seen in Figure 6.1, but
outpaced labor productivity until the early 1990s. This change took place at a
time when labor productivity was increasing at an unparalleled rate, nothing
truly comparable in the past 60 years. The increase in labor productivity likely
emerged from the increased use of technology in the workplace and the
benefits that come with it. The use of technology has drastically reduced
production times and increased output. Looking back at the equation for labor
productivity, it is easy to see that a large increase in output and an increase in
GDP, which is not met with an increase in income or other compensation
variable, will serve to deplete the wage per output value.

17

16

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010c
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Source: Economic Report of the President 2006,Table B-4918

It is natural then to question whether the emergence of increased
international trade, globalization, and the stagnation in wages are related. In
particular, unionists and manufacturing employees question whether
globalization caused the stagnation in wages, and the backward slide in
incomes of low-wage workers. Many observers answer in the affirmative – an
answer that is full of implications for policy. Organized labor and other labor
groups have been quick to point to this depletion in wage/output spreads and
have blamed much of the decrease on the effects of international trade and the
unequal labor conditions that exist in the major trading partners of the United
States. Union leaders and critics are quick to call on the familiar cord of the
“race to the bottom” as a way to not only cement the blame of the transition
on the lack of a strong international labor body and ubiquitous international
labor statutes which would allow the United States to more easily compete for
international markets. The role of a labor union is to protect and increase the
salaries of the workers which they represent. The declining salary share has
eaten into this spread causing unions to become defensive as they are
increasingly facing identity crises.19
It is fair and entirely necessary to point out that labor unionization is
most prevalent among low-skilled or skilled, but low-educated workers.
Unionization is most common in the trade fields (mechanics, electricians,
17

McLaren, 2011
Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2007
19
McLaren, 2011
18
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construction, and plumbing just to name a few) and among low-skilled
workers in manufacturing and farming. There are exceptions to this rule of
course as there are professional unions as well as many positions in public
service that have union representation but are professional careers. However,
these remain exceptions as the overarching rule remains true. Educational
attainment is most often correlated with union representation; low-education,
low- skilled workers tend to have a higher propensity for union membership.
The United States ranks highly among fellow industrialized countries
in terms of educational attainment. Shown in the chart below is the
educational attainment for the OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries in 2007. Educational attainment is
defined as the highest level of education completed by an individual and is an
important indicator of the prevalence of skilled or unskilled labor available to
the workforce in a specific country. As can be seen, the United States ranks
third on this list with 40% of the adult population having earned a university
degree and another 48% having completed a high school education. While
only having a high school education is often considered to be representative of
unskilled labor, in many nations that the United States trades with, (see
Mexico, Portugal, Germany, Austria, and Italy who all have over that 75% of
the adult population only having completed a high school education) the vast
majority of the population does not have a university degree. Moving outside
of the OECD reveals an even more stark reality, making the United States a
skilled labor abundant country when compared to the vast majority of the
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world, especially China. The skilled labor abundant status of the United States
is important for wage and labor analysis, most easily shown in the use of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem of international trade.

15

Highest Level of Education Attained in
China Aged 15 yrs and Older, 2005
6.59%

No schooling/Kindergarten

5.23%

3.69%

10.59%

2.88%

Primary/Elementary
Lower Secondary/Middle
School
Some Secondary/High School

15.69%

7.78%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People's
Republic of China, 2005 Household Survey

Matriculation/High School
Graduate
Non-degree Tertiary (Some
College)
Degree Tertiary (College
Graduation)

20

20

Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010b
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The Stolper-Samuelson theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin model21 on
which it depends are two of the most well-known theories in international
trade and labor mobility. The Stolper-Samuelson theory has a profound effect
on income distribution and world commodity and labor prices. The effect is
often used to explain the profound losses that American unskilled labor22 has
experienced in the last half decade, in both employment numbers and wages.
Both models depend on the factor endowments that each country in the trade
relationship processes, in this case the relative proportions of skilled and
unskilled labor. It is important to note that in an age of increased globalization
and labor mobility, the labor proportions (skilled vs. unskilled) are more likely
to change due to legal and illegal immigration. However, both of these
economic ideas depend on fixed-factor endowments that are mobile across
domestic industries, yielding a set number of skilled and unskilled workers
and a defined wage for each group in each economy. In a forthcoming book,
John McLaren provides a comprehensive example of this effect using a
hypothetical situation involving trade between China and the United States
which uses accurate characteristics and fabricated numbers.
While McLaren provides an in-depth setup for his explanation of the
theorem, it can be simplified for the purposes of this research. He assumes
21

Description of the Stoper-Samuelson and Hecksher Olin models derived from John
Mclaren, forthcoming, 2011. For more on the model and its various empirical applications,
see Feenstra, 2004, pp.4-29 and Chapters 2 and 3.
22
For the purposed of this discussion, “unskilled labor” will be defined as those having an
educational attainment of a high school education or less. However, education is not the only
way to attain skilled labor attributes so a more accurate term would be, as John McLaren
suggests, “blue-collar” instead of unskilled and “white-collar” instead of skilled.
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that there are two goods produced in the two countries - plastics and apparel and that apparel is a unskilled labor intensive good, meaning it takes more
units of unskilled labor to produce than skilled labor, and plastics is the
opposite - a skilled labor intensive good. He also accurately assumes that
China is an unskilled labor abundant country and that the United States is a
skilled labor abundant country (see charts above for actual figures).

23

Looking at the graph, we can analyze the factor endowments for the
U.S. and China and the effect that this has on prices and output. A/P is defined
as the relative output of apparel (quantity apparel/quantity plastics), and PA/Pp
is the relative price of plastics (price apparel/price plastic). RSCH, RSUS, and
RS W are the relative supplies in China, the United States and the world (with
trade) respectively, and RD is the relative demand in the market for goods,

23

McLaren, 2011
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assumed to be a constant, negative linear equation. This graph shows that the
RSUS is lower than both RSW and RSCH meaning that in the United States,
there is a higher proportion of plastics produced when compared to the
production of apparel and in China there is just the opposite — a higher
proportion of apparel with respect to plastic production. These characteristics
are due to the fact that there is more skilled labor in the United States; hence,
workers specialize more heavily in plastic production than in China where
there is an abundance of unskilled labor and therefore a higher apparel
production. Due to the greater production of plastics in the United States, the
price of apparel relative to plastic is higher and the opposite is true in China
where greater apparel production causes a lower relative price.
When these two countries come together to trade with the world,
relative supply lies closer to the production in China before trade due to
China’s immense population. This means that the price of plastics in the
United States will increase as the Chinese market is opened up to American
export and the price of apparel in the United States will decrease due to the
fact that the large apparel production in China will flood the U.S. markets
with cheaper apparel. The opposite is true in China where the price of plastics
will decrease and the price of apparel will increase. The effect alone, ceteris
paribus, has a negative impact on the wages of labor intensive, low-education
employment in the United States due to Chinese competition and has a
positive income effect on highly-educated employment in the U.S. due to the
opening of the Chinese market. The effect can best be described as assisting
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the abundant labor resource in each country, meaning that the income gap in
the United States will increase and the income gap in China will decrease.24
This is seconded by Kim Elliot who writes, “It is also natural that increase
trade with low-wage LDCs (low developed countries), and increased capital
mobility, should concern workers and trade unions in advanced countries.
Low-wage workers in advanced countries lose relative to high-wage workers
and capital when trade and capital flows increase between their country and
LDCs.”25 With this result, it is obvious why organized labor in developed
countries like the United States, whose members are largely made up of
“unskilled” or blue-collar workers, would oppose globalization without
guarantees of protection and increased pressure to include labor laws and
requirements in all liberalizing trading agreements.
B. The Case for Globalization Enthusiasts
It is undeniable that Americans as a group benefit greatly from free
liberalized trade. Globalization enthusiasts are eager to point out that the
increasingly pervasive forces of globalization stand ready to make America
even more prosperous, allowing the United States to arguably remain the
24

However it is important to point out that the theory of LDC-DC trade reducing inequality in
developing countries is not without critics, like most economic theories. In an extensive study
into the Stoper-Samuelson effect and post trade inequality in developing countries, Dollar and
Kraay (2001) have found that the results are inclusive to prove this reduction in inequality. In
their report they found that while, on average, poor people did in fact gain proportionately
from growth, that it did not always reduce inequality. In the 23 globalizing countries that they
studied, inequality (measured by Gini coefficients) increase in 10 of the 23 countries,
remained constant in 4 and did in fact fall in 9 of the 23 countries. Most notably they
discovered that China and Chile, two of the better known and researched developing
countries, actually had large increases in equality. However after carefully looking at their
studies they did not accurately handle the rural China workers who have been largely left out
of globalization. This stands to reason that the ballooning middle class and growing upper
class in China will of course result in growing inequality with the rural poor who have been
neglected and whose economic situation has largely have remained unchanged.
25
Elliot, 2003
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global hegemon, only this time as the world’s consumption center – that is if
they can hold at bay the protectionist forces of organized labor and the
proponents of expanding international labor rights. Globalization enthusiasts
are not just corporations and multinationals looking to expand their profits by
taking advantage of third-world workers and weak foreign governments.
These globalization enthusiasts are academics, politicians, businessmen,
multinationals, and scientists to name a few. Globalization may be a scary
thought - opening up to the rest of the world and allowing a freer flow of
goods, ideas, and people - but if you are able to see past the work of
globalization fear mongers like the late Samuel Huntington, it isn’t hard to
realize the great economic advances that are capable from globalization, and
that putting blocks, such as strong labor standards in the way of this growth,
could be detrimental to the process.
However, it is entirely necessary to point out that unions and trade
advocates are not two diametrically opposed sides in this argument. In fact, it
should be pointed out that throughout the first half of the 20th century and
until the 1960s, manufacturing and business was deeply rooted in the
protectionist camp as they vigorously fought for trade restrictions in order to
give themselves a comparative advantage. I.M. Destler explains it best in his
book American Trade Politics when he writes, “Through much of U.S.
history, it was manufacturers who led the charge for high tariffs. In the
decades following 1934, it was protection-seeking firms and sectors whose
efforts needed to be resisted or deflected in order for trade liberalization to

21
proceed. By the dawn of the 21st century business was clearly identified with
trade expansion, by critics and advocates alike.”26 While the position of
American industrialists and corporations has undergone an almost complete
180 degree change one would be hard to find a globalization enthusiast who
supports child labor and is more than okay with compulsory labor. “Labor and
other human rights are fine, in their view, but should not get in the way of
promoting growth through free trade and markets.”27In fact most enthusiasts
agree with organized labor in support of a majority of the “core” labor
standards, they are more afraid of the efforts that are in place to instill “cash
standards” which will negatively affect the comparative advantage of
developing countries, cheap labor.
Before moving on it is important to distinguish cash standards and
core standards from each other. Cash standards represent increases to labor
standards which involve the compensation of the worker or the time period
over which an employee is allowed to work. These standards include
minimum wage, benefits (such as retirement, health care, worker’s
compensation, and any other cash-based employer provided benefits), number
of hours per day and per week regulations, safety regulations and codes, and a
number of other regulations. While some activists and many organized labor
organizations often include one or more of these standards in their ideas of
core standards (often a minimum wage, hours allowed and workplace safety
concerns), the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines core labor
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standards more specifically. They have four core standards which include: 1)
freedom from forced labor; 2) nondiscrimination in the workplace; 3)
effective abolition of child labor; and 4) freedom of association and the right
to organize and bargain collectively.28
While the current debate in the global stage is over primarily these
core labor standards, organized labor consistently pushes the adoption [or at
least a commitment to forward, of at least some of the cash standards].
Globalists and businesses alike point out the fact that it is these cash standards
that would be detrimental to growth and commerce. These cash standards also
represent a dangerous intervention of one government into the business and
social laws of another developing-nation - a main reason why Republican
lawmakers have, over the past 40 years, made a transition toward siding with
business again the idea of instituting labor regulations into present and future
trading agreements and international organizational codes.
It seems hard to imagine that the labor side of the debate would be able
to effect policy in the ways and to the extent that they do, seemingly pitted
against a well-funded and well-connected behemoth that is reminiscent of a
David and Goliath reference. But who are these Goliaths and what do they
really stand for. As Kim Elliot puts it, “The policymakers that promote
globalization, by contrast, have government, international, and corporate
resources behind them. They have the authority to develop trade policies and
to administer the structural adjustment and financial stabilization programs
that they view as in the world’s interest. They are powerful figures in the
28
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global economy, with billions of dollars to leverage their policy
prescriptions.”29
As we look into the globalist’s stance on labor rights, it is important to
focus on the reasons why they have presented an obstacle to international
labor standards. The first of such concerns is the effects that these standards
will have on the growth potential of international business and most
importantly of developing countries. The second concern is that organized
labor is putting too much emphasis on the loss of American manufacturing
jobs while the U.S. remains the top global manufacturer - American
manufacturing represents far less of a fraction of national GDP as it once did
and manufacturing employment is tied to technological substitution. The third
and most important reason behind blocking expansive international labor
standards lies with the foreign workers who could be hurt by expanding
standards; while the individual workers may benefit, in the long run, the
workers lose out to potential opportunities as well as freedom to institute their
rights as they see fit.
Do strong labor standards spell a drastic recall to international growth,
specifically in the Asian nations which have posted unthinkable growth based
on their cheap labor and production capabilities? Asian countries are the only
examples of successful development since World War II. Countries such as
South Korea have gone from utter destruction and decimation to having the
15th largest GDP in the world at almost $1 trillion.30 East Asia’s development
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has been widely called the “Asian miracle” and billions of the world’s people
are being lifted out of poverty as countries like China have expanded.
However, increasing labor standards may bring this drastic growth under
arrest and globalists are crying foul that it is the intention of organized labor to
reel in this growth and create a more equal playing field for American
workers. In 1994, Mahathir bin Mohammad accused developed countries’
governments of trying to use standards as a weapon against developingcountry growth, writing that “Western governments openly propose to
eliminate the competitive edge of East Asia…. The professed concern about
workers welfare is motivated by selfish interest… to put as many obstacles as
possible in the way of anyone attempting to catch up and compete in the
West.”31 It is this growth which may eventually lead to the domestic
imposition of labor standards in many of these developing countries, allowing
the people to have a say in which standards, if any at all, that they see as
necessary. The fight for labor rights in each individual developing market will
be a more stable and efficient process given the fact that not all markets will
require the same rights. This will allow the governments to focus on the rights
which are necessary, expediting the process and avoiding unneeded rights
which can be burdensome to business and restricting on GDP growth.
The truth is that the imposition of labor rights, and the work of labor
unions, does have a negative impact on the GDP of countries, especially in the
developed world where unions are both powerful and have been able to instill
numerous standards. As can be witnessed in the below graph, the United
31
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States does not depend as much on trade as a component of its GDP. Among
the countries presented, the United States ranks last in dependence and
prevalence of trade in GDP. This is not to say that the United States is not a
heavy trading partner. In fact it has the largest aggregate value of imports and
exports in the world, but due to the fact that the United States has a GDP of
$14.26 trillion, according to the 2009 CIA estimate, the total value of trade
cannot compare to this economic power.
This GDP could be even higher in the absence of strict rules imposed
on companies through the actions of Western governments and organized
labor. According
to a major study
done by Richard
Vedder and
Lowell Gallaway
in 2005, they
found that over the
54-year period
they studied
(1947-2000) the
total aggregate negative effect of unionization in America by 1992 - in terms
of lost income and competition based wage differentials - exceeded $50
trillion. This is a staggering amount seeing that current economic estimates of
the total cost of the projected deficit in Medicaid amounts to approximately
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the same figure, meaning that if we were able to recover the losses due to
unionization, we could theoretically use that amount to completely fix one of
this nation’s greatest looming problems, deficits in the Medicaid program. The
effects on developing countries would be much more drastic. The future
prosperity and industrialization of these countries depends on the success of
this period of economic expansion; anything that may affect this delicate
scenario could permanently rob the country of both potential growth and
trillions of dollars in future GDP.32
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Even though employment in the manufacturing sector in the United
States has declined over the past half century, America remains the world’s
largest producer of manufactured goods. It is fair to point out that many more
jobs have been lost due to technological substitution as they have been due to
low-cost foreign competition. As can be seen in the pie chart below, the
United States produces 18% of the total global manufacturing output, leading
all of the world’s countries and only being eclipsed by the combined output of
the European Union which sits at 24.5%.34 This should be taken as evidence
of the fact that although the United States has witnessed huge losses in
manufacturing employment the United States has not given up its long held
role of being both the leading producer and the consumer of the world’s
manufactured goods.
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An important concept surrounding the loses in manufactuirng
employment that combats the organized labor argument that free trade has
caused the downsizing is technological substitution. Globalization supporters
are quick to point out that technological substitution has played a pivotal role
in the advancement and expansion of American manufacturing into the 21st
century, allowing the U.S. to stay competitive even when it was losing its
manufacturing edge in some industries. It is important to note that while
organized labor points to the jobs which have been lost as detrimental to our
society, globalizers believe that this downsizing has been met with an
expansion to labor productivity and capital investment, allowing the United
States to remain at the top of global manufacutirng and break into the hightech fields of the future. This technological innovation and substitution does
35
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come at a cost to the workers who used to be employed in these industries.
But, organized labor must look at the issue intellectually and objectively and
racknowledge that many of the jobs that have been lost are in industries that
are no longer competitive in the United States. Supporting noncompetitive
industries such as American low-skilled manufacturing (textiles and shoes) is
not only holding back American workers from potentially more lucrative and
more advanced careers, but as shown before, presents an enormous drain on
resources which could be better allocated and pulls down GDP due to deadweight loss.
Strong labor standards in international trade that are meant to level the
playing field between American manufacturing workers and developing world
employment have the most drastic effects on the workers themselves, and
most directly, on international workers. Organized labor admittedly does in
fact protect American workers and goes a long way to increase wages and
defend the vital standards that keep American workers safe in their
workplaces. However, this was not always the case and the current standards
situation is the product of over 100 years of back and forth arguments to reach
an agreement over standards. However, organized labor and standards
advocates now seek to force the more than a century of trial and error in labor
regulations that developed countries have undergone on our trading partners,
regardless of whether it truly is helpful to them and appreciated by them.
Increasing standards has and will continue to have the most direct effect on
the workers themselves, reducing potential employment in all union-protected
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sectors and taking away from developing-country workers the chance to work
toward the American dream, which is enjoyed by so many Americans today.
Strong, pervasive labor standards have made America’s workers safer
but they also
negatively affect
workers. Pushing
these standards on
our trading partners
will hurt American
workers and foreign
workers. The
expansion of global
labor rights won’t
have such a direct
and drastic effect on
American workers,
but they will
assuredly be
affected. Labor unions were shown to have a negative effect on U.S. GDP and
this reduction serves to reduce the earnings potential of workers as well. In the
same study by Vedder and Gallaway, they used quantitative analysis to show
that strong organized labor has led to the overall decrease in the wages that
could have been earned on a state average per capita basis. This is likely due
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to the fact that as organized labor forces wages rise, the wages of those people
who are unprotected remain constant, or in other words, fall relative to union
employment.
It is also a well know concept that unionization has and will continue
to cause a decrease in employment. “Presumably, the union presence in (a)
sector will lead to wages among union members rising above the competitive
standard. This will reduce employment in the union sector….”36As the
incomes that companies must pay rise, there is less money to spend on the
hiring of new employees. In some cases, in the wake of the increase there is
not enough money to maintain current workforce numbers absent an increase
in corporate profits. Therefore, while the purpose of unions is to increase
wages and attempt to guarantee safer and more secure employment for the
workers they represent, unions, by their nature and role alone, have the
capacity and have in actuality, cost the jobs of a number of Americans in an
attempt to secure others. This represents a troubling situation for developing
countries that are finally attaining employment growth and can see prosperity
on the horizon.
The American worker is assisted beyond a reasonable doubt by the
international expansion of labor rights as it allows them to gain some of the
low-skill manufacturing competitive edge that has shifted to low-wage
developing-nations, allowing for the market to support some jobs in the
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United States which would have been outsourced ceteris paribus.37 However,
this is not to say that these same workers in the United States who are
benefitting are not also being hurt by the extension of these rights. These
workers are not likely to see their incomes rise after standards expansion
despite the fact that the goods they purchase are guaranteed to rise. The
American consumer, and global consumers in general, have claimed a
preference for large quantities of cheaper goods and based on the success of
brands such as Wal-Mart and Target, there is clearly a market for cheap goods
contrary to the survey results presented in Kimberly Eliot’s work. It is
primarily the low-skilled, low-wage workers who are most likely to take
advantage of low-cost big box stores in order to save money and provide for
themselves and their families. A rise in global standards will mean that
developing-world workers will have be to paid more or will at the very least
require more money to maintain production under the new guidelines. This
means increased export good prices and low-wage consumers in developed
nations will suffer a relative decrease in purchasing power. In addition, the
companies who hire them might also have operations in these developing
countries. Once their bottom lines are raised by international standards, profits
will suffer and so will employment, and the least cost-effective workers will
be let go, leading to American layoffs.
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Developing-nation workers who maintain their jobs stand to gain the
most from expanding international labor standards. However in the aggregate,
it is these workers who will suffer the most detrimental side effects. Globalists
and corporations alike have been quick to point out the fact that expanding
these rights too quickly will lead to a negative impact on the very people that
these standards are allegedly designed to protect. The most detrimental aspect
will assuredly be a drop in developing-country employment. Shown in the
charts below are the GDP and GDP per capita for the South East Asian
nations for 2008. It should be noted that the South East Asian nations have
undergone tremendous growth over the past two decades. The growth is most
easily represented in the meteoric rise of China and most drastically since
1995 when China entered into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Adopting strong labor standards would place this growth at risk when the
peoples of these countries are just beginning to rise out of abject poverty and
become real players in the global economy. The second graph clearly shows
this rise on a per capita basis - the nearly vertical line after the late 1990s and
throughout the 2000s. Globalists know that accepting these standards will put
a halt on the rise of the developing middle class.
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Labor standards have a negative impact on aggregate employment.
The developing-nations of Asia, in particular, have notoriously had issues
with employing their often ballooning populations and increasing the cost that
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firms will face entering into a more strict market. This will only lead to these
same companies adding fewer jobs or downsizing the current number of
positions in order save money amid the increased costs. While the jobs that
they may be working may not be on par with the quality and standards in the
developed world, the positions that these globalizing corporations offer are
often unfathomably better than the ones that were available prior to the
economic growth – documentaries often show workers in these developingnations picking through garbage to find scrap metal or doing similarly unsafe
and poor quality jobs. Globalization supporters claim that organized labor has
failed to provide options for the third-world workers who are displaced by
increasing standards. In the large urban cities of the developing world where
many of these jobs are located, there are often no alternative jobs for these
workers to fall back on, especially in China where many workers have come
into these urban centers from the rural farming areas. It would be a shame to
rob them of the economic growth potential that lies within globalization and
the opening of free markets.
As a secondary detriment to the people in the developing world,
forcing labor standards on foreign governments and workers does not allow
them to have the rights to control their own security and safety. In a country
so in tune with its own limitations under the Federalist system, globalists cry
foul that the United States is attempting to impose labor standards on
developing-nations. It should be noted that the United States did not begin to
institute labor rights until the turn of the 20th century and only after both
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significant legal efforts and after the United States had industrialized to the
point where the labor rights were in strong demand. There is strong evidence
to prove that with the growing middle class in China and other developingworld countries citizens too will begin to demand increased labor rights. As
long as a forum to discuss and fight for these rights is present or at least
feasible in these countries, it is fair to assume that workers in the developing
world will too begin to demand labor standards, regardless of developednation pressures.
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III.

Changing Constituencies and Changing votes: A recent history
of American Trade policy
There has been a drastic change within the Democratic Party over the

past century in dealing with free trade. Since 1962 the Democratic Party has
been marching in lockstep down a path toward decidedly more rigorous and
specific regulations being attached to Free (or Regional) Trading Agreements
(FTAs). In the 2006 and 2008 elections, more than ever before in the past 50
years, issues of free trade took hold over the election and became a central
piece of not only voting patterns, but campaign attention and advertisements.
Millions of dollars were spent and many of the most hotly contested battles in
Ohio, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and in many other old
manufacturing-based states in the Northeast and Midwest were built upon
opposition to the recent free trade agreements negotiated under President Bush
and to NAFTA passed by President Clinton.
With the economy in the grips of the worst recession since the Great
Depression, rising unemployment in the United States, especially within
manufacturing, protecting the interests of American workers is even more
important. Protecting these interests by curbing the “freeness” of FTAs has
become a winning formula for the Democratic Party which had operated
under the idea that Free Trade Agreements would always benefit the
American worker and allow Americans to prosper amid increasing
globalization. The Democratic Party no longer prescribes in large numbers to
this logic as the world has advanced beyond a point where the power of
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emerging economies to change the fabric of international commerce can be
ignored.
The Democrats in Congress won big in 2006 and 2008 by promoting
the ideas that protectionism is a good thing for the United States and in their
individual states and districts. Protectionism safeguards the manufacturing
jobs in the U.S. that have been hit hardest over the last 20 years. However, the
question lies as to whether the protectionist case of instituting worker rights
provisions in any and all future trade agreements does in fact help American
workers or hurt them. Democrats and their growing base of people who have
been adversely affected by trading agreements and globalization are
promoting the idea that agreements on labor rights and laws should have and
must have a place in trading agreements negotiations. The idea of factor
mobility explains the basis of why the Democrats have made this switch
toward protectionist policies, and why they will continue to champion the
cause of labor rights as having a critical place in protecting the future
wellbeing of not only hard-working blue-collar Americans, but for the future
of American businesses and competiveness in the face of growing world
powers like China, who have a seemingly unlimited supply of workers willing
to work in poorer conditions for very little wages.
However, the issue of competing with developing world powers, like
China, goes deeper than the surface problems which touch the lives of
Americans in the manufacturing industry and takes precedent in the American
political arena. Enacting labor rights and requirements statues in trade
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agreements could have lasting and potentially damaging consequences for the
world economy and the standard of living for billions of the world’s people if
not handled properly. The American trade policy being championed by advent
fair traders in Congress, a collation whose ranks ballooned in 2006 and 2008,
will lead to an overall decrease in the standard of living for the world’s
poorest nations – contrasting the claims of labor rights advocates. If their
views are not diluted and lessened by more moderate voices in the Democratic
Party and in government as a whole, too powerful labor regulations could
stifle the growth that many developing countries have been enjoying for the
last decade.
Whichever side of the labor argument, free trade or fair trade, is
declared the winner in a game that could not possibly be “won” for all
intensive purposes, there are favorable wind filling the sails of the fair traders
and those who study trade and international commerce should realize that
there will be labor stipulations built into future US RTAs and FTAs; the
question will be how strong the provisions are and whether the world’s
developed and developing countries will agree to change their ways in order
to covet the growth potential inherent in relations with the United States, the
economic engine of the world.
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IV. The Beginnings of the American Divide on Trade: A
Democratic Turnaround.
I. Democrats in Congress: A Territorial Shift, and Platform Change
A. Democratic Trade Platform during the Great Depression and
Post-War Boom
For much of the 20th century, trade has been characterized by a general
movement toward freer, liberalized trade practices. While there have been
some heinous examples of protectionism and movement to retract, both
parties, until the last half of the century, moved toward liberalized trade. As
can be seen in the chart below, Democrats and Republicans had staked out
their own opposing viewpoints on international trade throughout the 19th and
early 20th century.
The Democrats, holding the majority of their seats in the rural and
agricultural South, supported free trade practices as it opened up the markets
to which American produce, cotton, and other raw materials could be shipped.
In the North, made up of primarily Republican districts (the political layout of
the country would not fully change to its current or more recognizable layout
until the 1960s), the heavy influence of manufacturing and factory labor made
the balance more difficult. Republicans thusly, protecting their constituency
and attempting to make a protective nest for the growing but still infant U.S.
manufacturing sector, tended to vote more heavily in favor of restrictions to
liberal international trade, at least until World War II.
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Figure I-1

39

In the 1930s and the early Roosevelt administration, the majority of
Democrats were supporting the reciprocal trade platform, and almost all
Republicans had opposed it.40 It was very difficult for the Republican, and
then the Democrats, to support a platform on trade which disproportionately
negatively affected their constituency, regardless of whether it was good for
the nation as the whole. In his landmark book, Destler points out this delicate
balance. He claims that in most circumstances open trade, by maximizing
economic efficiency, enhances the welfare and the standard of living in the
U.S. and in the wider world.
However, due to the fact that the costs of international trade are
concentrated, they bear particularly on those firms and workers whose home
39
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market will be diminished by foreign competition. In this case, American
manufacturing, which has faced increasingly tougher foreign competition
since World War II, stands to lose to the greater low value added (LVA)
manufacturing (textiles, shoes, simple manufactured products)
competitiveness in the developing-world. He says that trade policy must
respond to the concerns of those inversely affected, and that some form of
action constraining some imports will typically be part of this response.41
In the 1930s, renowned political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued
that the wide discrepancy in Senate voting patterns and movement on the trade
issue was very heavily influenced by an imbalance on trade. Since the Great
Depression destroyed the demand that fed Northern U.S. manufacturing,
Republicans began a decade-long slide on trade that saw few, if any,
Republicans supporting trade liberalization. Labor unions in the North,
feeding off of the difficult economic period, pressed their representatives hard
for protectionist measures. Their goal was to isolate themselves from the
global depression that saw foreign trade drop by over 50%, in part due to
falling incomes and a wave of trade barriers which protected national
manufacturing interests at the cost of world trade. However, it should be noted
that the power of labor unions in really influencing trade agreements, other
than industry specific protections, would not truly develop until the latter part
of the century.
With the Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress and the
presidency, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff represented the power of organized
41
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labor that would revive later in the century during another tough economic
period. The tariff was passed with strong Republican support based on the fact
that producers and workers threatened by imports tend to be concentrated,
organized and ready to advance their interests in the political arena. On the
other hand, in the Democratic districts in the South and among business
leaders, those who benefitted from trade were, and still are, generally diffuse,
and so they presented limited resistance to the tariff.
For a politician who must respond to concentrated interests (against
free trade), a vote for lowering trade barriers when his/her constituents are
suffering and facing strong competition is as one former official put it, an
“unnatural act.”42 However, the restrictive nature of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
to allow the nation, or any nation, to rebound was recognized as being such an
obstacle and a failed measure that in 1934 the new Democratic Congress
passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and started an almost 40year trend supporting liberalized trade.
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Figure I-2

Source: Baily, et al., 1997, p. 312

For the first time both Democrats and Republicans joined together to
fight for the same path on trade, opening America back up to growth and
prosperity in the post bust era, and allowing the United States to be a linchpin
in the allied success in World War II.
With the break out of World War II, the trend that is widely visible in
Table I-1 seemed to come to an end. Beginning with the wartime growth of
government in the middle and late 1940s and early 50s, Republicans began to
see that supporting the liberal framework was in their best interests as it
furthered the Republican ideas of being skeptical about government
intervention into the economy. While it would seem that the Democrats would
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have been moving in the opposite direction as they increased government
intervention during the new deal and World War II period, the Democrats
throughout the 1940s and 1950s continued to maintain their traditional support
of low tariffs and trade liberalization. This was interesting to look at seeing
that the pressure from the Southern Democrat’s districts was in favor of
moving toward greater intervention as the increased competition threatened
the south’s major economic exports. This failure to make the logical policy
decisions on trade began to cause a shift in the southern representatives.
However, the shift that had been long awaited, and was seemingly always just
around the corner, took a back seat for the next 30 years, and trade did not
again become a major point of contention between the parties until the mid to
late 1960s.
Trade in the in post WWII era was not high on people’s lists of
concerns. This gave politicians an extremely high amount of liberty to pursue
the policies that they deemed necessary. Democrats and Republicans alike
witnessed firsthand how protectionist policies caused the Great Depression to
linger far longer than it should have. They had seen the potential that lies in
liberalized trade in that while the rest of the developed world was fighting and
their industrial capabilities were either maxed out or being destroyed, the
United States was doing the opposite, building capacity and production to
levels never seen before. Liberal trade policies were also buttressed by the
need to combat Communism. The United States quickly realized that poor,
shattered countries that had starving, unemployed people based on the
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outcome of World War II were breeding grounds for Communist sympathy.
Massive financial and industrial aid was sent to Europe - the Marshall Plan so that they could rebuild and start trading with us again. Not to mention, the
United States was securely on the top for the first time, and throughout the
world, there was no country able to rival its production capacity. The United
States was prosperous and was pumping out the supplies and materials needed
to rebuild in Europe, and thusly, the jobs remained after World War II.43 With
the American public, for all intensive purposes disinterested in international
trade, a booming economy whose unemployment remained low, and a,
relatively speaking, unvocal labor union sector, liberal trade became the best
plan for America, even if it disparately affected groups of people, a condition
that would eventually lead to the erosion of the liberal trade juggernaut.
However, as would seem obvious, such an advantage could not and
did not last long. American anxiety about foreign completion grew as the
relative position of the U.S. declined. The striking success of nations like
Japan sowed seeds of doubt about the liberal doctrine. In this environment,
many Americans became skeptical of the liberal image of a world growing
more and more open, barraged with increased global competition, and
increasingly controlled by common rules of nondiscrimination in trade. “What
they came to see was an ‘unfair’ world where other nations played loose with
the rules and ‘nice guys’ were likely to finish last.”44 As Europe and Japan
quickly rebounded from the devastation of WWII, American businesses began

43
44

Destler, 2005, p.7
Destler, 2005, p. 9

47
to face increased competition at a time when the value of the dollar was so
high it made American products even less competitive when compared to
cheaper foreign goods.
While America as a whole remained prosperous and growing, labor
unions began to become more vocal in the second half of the century. By the
1970s, they were making increased demands of both the system and
politicians. The labor unions were kept at bay, at least temporarily, when, in
1953, Trade Adjustment Assistance was formulated in the Randall
Commission by Donald McDonald of the United Steelworkers Union.
Although the commission rejected it, the idea was picked up by a group of 16
senators, one being John Kennedy. The adoption of TAA and its subsequent
push for passage allowed Democrats to protect their labor base and at the
same time continue to promote trade liberalization. Where at one time this
could be done together, that time had passed and would not return again,
especially today when trade liberalization is considered an evil process among
most union leaders.
Another method deployed by labor unions and politicians alike was
“special cases.” In the post-war period, the most important and vocal special
case was the textile industry — an industry that was always vulnerable to
international competition. The textile industry, representing 2.5 million
workers and located in every state in the United States, wielded a large
amount of power in politics.45 Appeasing the textile industry became a
required aspect of the Democrat’s platform on trade. Giving in to textile
45
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interests by adopting textile specific protectionist measures allowed the
Democrats to continue to push a liberal trade agenda, but also save face in
their Southern districts. Much like the Buy America provisions that have come
to be argued today, they gave American firms who otherwise would lose out,
even in their home markets, the ability to compete and win against foreign
companies who made their products cheaper.
This tactic of working the South to garner support or at least stave off
rebellion was used throughout the post-war period. President Kennedy
continued this trend when he appeased the Southern cotton region in the 1960s
in order to allow the party as a whole to maintain a strong stance for liberal
trade expansion and vote heavily for Kennedy’s Trade Expansion Act in 1962,
but maintain support in their districts. The switch for the Democrats toward a
more protectionist path would not begin until labor unions began to turn out
and abandon the liberal trade path as being the most advantageous for the
future, both in terms of employment and prosperity for the workers that they
represented. This movement toward promoting greater intervention and
protection would not officially take flight until the late 1960s after the
Democratic Party made a historic movement to the Northern states with the
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960.46 This policy change from the unions
began to sway the northern Democrats who now made up the bulk of the
party, and thus the party priorities on trade began to move in a different
direction.
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B. The Increasing Politicization of Trade in the Post War Period
For a long time after World War II, American trade policy was
strongly aligned with advancing liberal trade policies. International trade was
viewed as not a very political topic, as it would grow to be by the end of the
century and into the current elections. While the parties did compete for the
support of important constituencies that favored certain trade positions, there
was without question, an overwhelming consensus in support of expanding
trade and reducing barriers to trade among members of Congress. The general
public, although tending toward protectionism, was largely disinterested in
trade politics which allowed politicians to have free reign to support and
propose further liberal trade expansion as they did not have to fear not being
reelected based on their trade views, a condition that would change.
While some industries, namely manufacturing sectors such as textiles,
steel, shoes, and many other small manufacturers which were already
beginning to face strong foreign competition, supported protectionist policies,
most American manufacturing and labor interests were largely not active on
trade issues. Although, they remained available to act on trade if an issue
arose that threatened them. However all of this changed in the 1970s and
1980s — turning trade into a political issue with stronger lobbying efforts.

While Democrats were taking advantage of the opportunity to tap into
the public sentiment of protectionism for electoral gains, the Republicans
toughened their trade stances. In the business sector, international
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competition was presenting a problem as cheaper goods from Japan and other
heavy exporting countries flooded the market based on the imbalance in
exchange rates where the strong dollar led to a drop in exports and a huge
spike in imports, which then led to the huge trade deficits that continue today
(see figure I-3).

Figure I-3
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The trade explosion saw a drastic increase in both imports and exports;
however, imports to the United States exploded beyond exports creating an
ever-growing trade imbalance. Exports and imports rose from $19.7 billion
and $14.8 billion respectively in 1960 to $1.16 trillion and $2.02 trillion
respectively in 2007, creating a trade deficit of just under $855 billion.
However, throughout this period, US manufacturing and producers of
consumer goods suffered greatly. Since the individuals and workers, most
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heavily in these two sectors, who lose from increased trade have a much
greater incentive to organize and actively promote a more protectionist trade
stance than do people who are befitting, the role, energy and influence of
unions became a stronger force as America continued to shed manufacturing
jobs while the trade deficit expanded.48
Labor unions, like the AFL-CIO, continued to make a transition away
from liberalization of trade practices and their stances began to grow much
more protectionist based on the changing landscape of manufacturing and
American business, as well as the growing trade imbalance. All of these
factors led Democratic legislators, the populous, and labor unions to start
questioning the longstanding concept that international trade was better off
without government control. While the turn on trade seemed inevitable, it was
slow and very sporadic within sectors. Labor unions would almost all,
eventually, begin to stand up and fight for protectionist measures, but the
automotive sector in the late 1960s and even early 1970s was still thriving and
doing well, despite the fact that everyone could see the rising Japanese
automotive industry as a threat, and so it was by the end of the 1970s.

C. From Support for the Kennedy Round to a Growth in Protectionism
The split between the parties was obvious in the Kennedy Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 when, in the House alone Democrats voted 210 to 44
in support of liberalizing trade relations, while Republicans voted to kill the
bill by a vote of 127 to 43. This basic split on trade with the Republicans
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generally opposing liberalized trade and Democrats lining up to support it was
very consistent with the prior three decades beginning in 1930 with the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
Generally speaking, Democrats aligned to support liberal trade practices and
the reduction of trade barriers and Republicans fought to increase
protectionism in an attempt to shelter American businesses and industry.49
While labor unions supported the Kennedy Round of tariff cutting, by the time
the legislation passed in 1967, textile manufacturers and steel workers were
demanding protection from increasing European and Japanese competition —
mainly because the value of the US dollar was so strong that it was unfairly
favoring import goods over exports, which hurt the U.S. producers while
giving a big boost to foreign competition. Unions began calling for “orderly
expansion of U.S. trade”50 .
The change from the 1960s was dramatic and visible, and heavily
influenced by regional representation, especially in the Democratic Party.
Only a decade after the Kennedy trade expansion, the House voted much
differently when a new trade round was introduced in 1973. The Democrat’s
constituency and thus platform switch was clear in their 121-112 vote against
the liberalizing round. Republicans almost universally voted to approve the
round by a vote of 160-19.
The switch on trade in the Democratic Party was driven by Northern
Democrats based on changing the fact that their constituencies, heavily
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industrial and manufacturing based, who had once benefited greatly from
liberal trade were now suffering from increased competition. In 1962
Northern Democrats supported the Kennedy round 141 to 7, but by 1973 they
voted 101 to 52 against opening another trade liberalizing round.
While some of the reasons behind this vote might be due to the
different parties in power in the White House (Democrats voted with the
Democrat, President Kennedy, in 1962 and against President Nixon, a
Republican, in 1973), claiming that it was more than a minor cause would
discredit the transformation that was beginning between the two parties
stances on trade. One of the most important factors behind the turnaround was
the switch in geographic bases of the parties.51 Throughout the first half of
the century, the base of the Republican Party was in the Northeast and
Midwest industrial centers. From the time of the election of Abraham Lincoln
until FDR, no Democratic presidential candidate carried Pennsylvania or
Michigan. The 1932 election was very telling when Hoover did not win a
single state west of Pennsylvania or south of Delaware. However, this all
changed in the 1960 election of President John F. Kennedy. Winning with 303
electoral votes, he carried Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey
and since then, the Democrats have claimed hold over the Northeast, and the
Republican stronghold has shifted to the West and eventually, the South.
The shift of Republican strongholds to the South and West reduced
their dependence on the protectionist issues which had helped them win votes
in the industrial North and Midwest. In the same way, the new Democratic
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strongholds in the North and Midwest, areas which are the bastion of big
labor, required Democrats to change their trade views in order to represent
their new constituency.
However this change should not have blindsided the trade sector as it
did. In the 1950s, Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter
analyzed a 1953 Roper poll that showed that 44% of ultra protectionists were
Democrats, and 46% of ultra liberal traders were Republican. Bauer and his
colleagues attribute this difference to education level where those with lower
education levels tended to be protectionist and vote Democratic while
professionals with college experience tended to be liberal and vote Republican
(American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade.52
Those of the lower education levels tended to work in factories and be a part
of union labor. On top of this, Republicans were the party of limited
government interaction whereas Democrats had, historically, been more open
to and accepting of a large, powerful central government. So it would seem
obvious that the party which supported more government would begin to
favor a protectionist trade policy where there was more control over trade and
its foreign and domestic elements, while the party who opted for less control
of government and more freedom for business would move away from the
protectionist path and align itself with the free traders and liberal trading
practices which gave businesses more control and leeway.
The switch in the support of liberal trade policies by labor unions was
quite interesting in that it occurred over the course of one decade. Throughout
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the 1950s and early 1960s, the big labor organizations remained true to their
free trade platform, however, by the 1970s, the AFL-CIO had started to make
their change on trade policy. While the organization had accepted and
campaigned hard for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in 1962 as part of
the Trade Expansion Act, they were denouncing it in the 1970s. Due to the
nature of TAA — providing a payment to those whose jobs were lost due to
outsourcing or foreign competition or other elements of trade — labor unions
in the 1970s began attacking TAA by calling it burial insurance. While it did
help those who were forced out of work, it did not do anything to deal with
the fact that liberalization of trade and foreign exposure had cost them their
job. The unfortunate part for trade liberalizing advocates was that the jobs that
were being lost due to trade were mostly being shed from the industrial
sectors of the Northeast and Midwest.
Due to the location where the jobs were being shed, Northern
Democrats continued their shift on trade in order to protect their constituents.
The auto and steel industries were being particularly hit hard leading to a
profound increase in the force and activity of labor organizations. Certain
candidates took advantage of the awakening of labor unions and saw this
emerging condition as a perfect opportunity to pick up electoral support. John
Connally, who was running on the Republican presidential ticket, made
international trade one of his top priorities and used the slumping industrial
sector to drum up support; he was the first candidate to make trade a central
aspect of his campaign since WWII. While Connally ended up not gaining the
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support needed at the convention, he did stir some excitement and fervor
when he made a promise while campaigning in 1979, that he would leave the
Toyotas to rust on the docks.53
In the 1980s, major industries in the United States such as textiles and
automobiles sought further federal actions in the form of restrictions, like
quotas and antidumping policies. While trade representatives did not agree
that these industries needed these restrictions in many cases, they were
powerless to stop it. Congressmen, in an attempt to carry the support of
important industries in their states, supported this legislation in Congress.
Although it might have seemed like the trend was unstoppable and that trade
liberalization was reversing order, Congress as a whole in the 1980s remained
in favor of liberalization, and members introduced these “protectionist” bills
knowing that in most cases they would not receive enough support to be
passed. However, the sheer discussion in Congress helped these Congressman
gain the support of powerful business and labor interests while also putting
pressure on the executive branch and foreign governments to steer clear of
making concessions that would negatively impact these industries.
With decreasing sales, an oil crisis and heavy foreign competition
from Japan, the automobile industry was in a crisis in the early 1980s and saw
a huge drop in profits to the point where 300,000 of the 1 million works in the
automobile industry were now unemployed. Ford and GM saw their profits
sink, and Chrysler needed a government bailout to stay in business. The
United Auto Workers (UAW), long time promoters of open trade when the
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American auto industry was the largest in the world, began to recoil on this
idea and sought out to impose import restrictions on Japan so that their sales
could rebound against the flood of cheaper, more fuel-efficient Japanese
vehicles in 1980s. In 1980, UAW president Douglas Fraser began a campaign
for “local content legislation.” Two years later with the crisis not getting any
better and the U.S. auto industry reeling from losses, the UAW pushed for
domestic content restrictions that required the more cars the company sold in
the United States the higher the percentage of the value of the car must come
from the United States. This meant that more of the parts making up Japanese
cars would be required to have been made in the United States if they were to
be sold in the United States.
While the bill’s passage was unlikely, its mere presence caused the
executive branch and trade officials to begin negotiations with the Japanese to
limit exports to the America. Following the actions of the unions,
Northeastern and Midwestern Democrats flocked to the bill and voted almost
unanimously. Although the bill never reached the Senate floor, the House’s
support for the measure was enough to warrant an agreement by the Japanese
to limit exports of automobiles for a time until the American corporations and
market could rebound. While the issue faded after 1983 when the U.S. auto
industry rebounded, it was clear that the Northeastern and Midwestern
Democrats remained true to their new base of support in the labor unions,
moving at whim based on their needs at any given moment.54
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As trade became a more salient issue and it became clear that the
American economy was growing too dependent on international trade,
Congressional interest in the topic soared, and floor debates and discussions
went from being rare and mostly ceremonial to drive home a specific point or
influence the president or foreign power, to a common occurrence. “Between
1975 and 1980, by one measure, the frequency of House and Senate floor
references to trade went up 70%.”55 According to the Congressional Research
Service, the number of trade restrictive bills also began to climb from 127 in
the 96th Congress (1979-80) to 144 in the 98th.56 The increase in trade-related
measures corresponded directly to the increase in trade, specifically on the
import side of the equation.
The rise in imports was likely due in part to the strength of the U.S.
dollar, which helped foreign competition enter into the American market like
never before while simultaneously hampering American production. In the
mid-1980s the price of the U.S. dollar rose 40% above the level needed for
American businesses to stay competitive and the trade balance fell to the point
where imports rose more than 50% above exports. The U.S. trade deficit hit
100 billion and kept growing.57 This rise in the trade deficit coupled with the
continued decline in American manufacturing caused both parties to seek to
protect American businesses and, most importantly for the Democrats,
American labor. Trade protectionism in the 1980-84 Congresses increased
drastically. Gary Clyde Hufbauer has calculated that, “U.S. imports covered
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by special protection, including increasing tariffs and quota restrictions, rose
from 12% of total imports in 1980 to 21% in 1984.”58 These protectionist
measures allowed the currency imbalance to correct itself while protecting
American worker and companies in the process. In the second half of the
1980s, the trade deficit began to decline as trade exploded, doubling in
magnitude from 1986 to 1992. By 1991, the trade deficit had fallen below the
all important $100 billion mark and American businesses looked to further
trade expansion under the more favorable climate. However, the majority of
Democrats remained skeptical of expanding trade on the basis that while
American business stood to gain, American labor was assuredly losing
ground.
The Republicans started to become concerned about how their stance
on trade would affect the midterm elections in 1986. In 1985, they had lost an
open Congressional seat when the Democrats blamed the Republican for
supporting imports that cost Americans their jobs. In the summer of 1986,
three prominent centrist Democrats, Sen. Lloyd Bentson of Senate Finance,
and Rep. Dan Rostenkowshi and Rep. Richard Gephardt of House Ways and
Means, had cosponsored a bill imposing surcharges on the countries that had
the largest trade surpluses — with the United States.59 Trade regained
momentum in the midterm elections in 1986 when the Democrats picked up
eight seats in the Senate, tipping the balance of power toward their party. The
West Virginia senator, and majority leader of the new Democratically
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controlled Senate, Bentson, wasted no time in declaring that trade would be a
top priority for the party in 1987-88.
With the Democrats in control of the Senate, the Reagan
administration could no longer fall on the balance in the senate to stop the
protectionist measure which had been flowing out of the Democratically
controlled House for the past few Congresses. The Omnibus Trade Act which
had failed in the previous Congress had been given new life through this
change, much to the chagrin of liberalized trade supporters and the Reagan
administration. The bill, HR 3, was a rehashing of the previous bill passed by
the House in 1986 that was vetoed by President Reagan. The bill did not
include any product specific protections, and did not include textiles which
would be included in a later bill, passed the House on April 30, 1987 with a
vote of 290 to 137; fourty-three Republicans joined in an almost unanimous
Democratic vote. The Senate the Finance committee reported out a bill in
early may with broad bipartisan support, 19 to 1. After a month of debate and
merging all of the separate committee versions together, the omnibus bill
passed the Senate by a vote of 71 to 27.
However, exterior events would change the bill’s course. While in
Conference Committee, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell over 500 points
in one day, “Black Monday,” causing the conferees to tred lightly and rethink
the 1000 plus pages of legislation that lay before them. Conferences on the
market decline lasted until December, putting trade off of the docket until
1988. Seeing that the markets were jumpy, Congressional leaders, including
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Rostenkowski and Bentson, began to turn their focus onto drafting a bill that
the president would sign. This sentiment of change flowed into the rest of the
conference when the House conferees proposed dropping all of the provisions
that were directly trade restrictive, and the Senate later agreed.
With the removal of the trade restrictive elements, HR 3 passed both
Houses, but was eventually vetoed by President Reagan who cited one of his
reasons as the labor-backed clause regarding notification prior to plant
closings. The Democrats were unable to gain an override vote in the Senate,
falling 5 votes short. However, with organized labor’s push to get the bill
passed, a new bill was drafted and named HR 4848. It was identical to HR 3,
without the plant-closing clause and an Alaskan oil clause that had been cited
as a reason behind Reagan’s veto. To the delight of organized labor interests,
and as part of the Democrats plan to get the major aspects of the old bill
passed, the plant-closings clause was introduced as a separate bill. With
outpouring support and advocacy spurred by labor interests, both bills passed
the House and Senate by overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Although
against the plant closings bill, but facing the prospect of being pegged as
“antiworker,” Reagan allowed the bill to become law without his signature.
As for HR 4848, Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 into law on August 23rd.60
Of all the Democratic contenders and activists in the 1980s, Sen. Walter
Mondale (D-MN), made trade and its effects on labor a central part to his
campaign for president in the run up to the 1984 general election. Mondale
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desperately needed the power of the labor union on his side and to put all of
their assets toward helping him win. In order to do this, he took a protectionist
stance, more so when speaking in front of a labor crowd. While Mondale was
careful never to fully commit to specific protectionism or tie himself to doing
specific things, he was quick to attack the Japanese for their unfair trade
practices and denounced the Reagan administration’s handling of the issue
when speaking to labor organizations. Mondale, who at the time was
vigorously courting the endorsement of the AFL-CIO, said in the run up to the
Democratic primary in 1984 that the United States needed to get tough on
trade or else job opportunities for its youth would be limited to working at
McDonald’s or sweeping up around Japanese computers.61 However it was
clear that, 50 years after the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement in
1934, the transition of the Democratic Party was becoming more locked as
only two Northeast and Midwest Democrats voted against the United Auto
Workers litmus test, the domestic content bill in 1984.
While it was a major change from how the party had voted for much of
the 1900s, the Democratic Party’s switch was never complete; a fact that
remains true today and is an important aspect of why trade policy remains
contentious and moving on a rather undecided track even with a filibusterproof majority in the Senate, a Democratic president and a substantial hold on
the House. While a strong stance on trade in favor of labor and against trade
liberalization helped Senator Harris Wofford (D-PA) win a surprise victory in
the 1991 Pennsylvania special election and Richard Gephardt (D-MO) win the
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Iowa caucuses in 1988, a protectionist stance on trade hurt several
candidates.62 During their campaigns for president, Mondale and Gephardt
found out the hard way that they had to tread lightly while speaking about
protectionism, even when their party seemed to be moving more and more in
that direction. Editorialists and Democratic competitors attacked their
protectionist platforms for their adverse effects on international appeal and
economic effects. The sole exception to protectionist criticism was Japan and
the fear of the growth of South East Asia. Japan, for much of the late 1900s,
was an easy target for politicians, as the vast majority of Americans saw Japan
as being unfair to the United States. In a 1988 Gallup poll (see results below)
1300 Americans were asked, “Do you think the following trading partners are
fair or unfair to the United States when it comes to trade?” While Canada and
Western Europe received a plurality of responses claiming that their trade was
fair, Japan was not viewed so kindly. With an overwhelming 65% of
responses in accord, trade with Japan was seen as unfair and harmful for the
United States.
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The Democratic Party was also fractured along power lines. The more
powerful chairmen and party leaders maintained their support for trade
liberalization, while the newly elected and less senior members of the party
trended, along with the base of the Democratic Party toward greater support of
a protectionist trade regime. The House Ways and Means Committee, the
group in charge of trade related issues in the House, Chairman Dan
Rostenkowski (D-IL) maintained his longtime support of free trade as did his
counterpart in the Senate, Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentson (DTX). Both men, along with the House and Senate Leadership, broke away
from their party when they supported Fast Track trade negotiating authority
for President Bush during NAFTA negotiations. Some Democrats decided to
sit the fence in this inter-party tug of war over which side would eventually
prevail and when. Gephardt, upon being elected as the new House majority
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leader in 1991, voted in support of Fast Track, even though he had fought it
before he was in a leadership role. Later in 1991, he introduced an amendment
with the purpose of singling out and attacking Japan for their large trade
imbalance with the United States.

D. Trade Polarization and Labor Conflict in the 1990s: NAFTA and its
Effects
Democrats and Republicans alike had signed onto the idea that liberal
trade policies were the correct progression for the United States in dealing
with an increasingly globalized world. However, with the trade events and the
currency fluxuations of the 1980s, by the 1990s, it was becoming increasingly
clear that trade was going to be a contentious political issue. The 1990s saw a
reemergence of the trade conflicts that existed in the 1950s as legislators
began to consider the individual provisions and limitations of the legislation,
specifically its implications to the increasingly important labor unions and
sensitive manufacturing as being more important than the passage of the bill
itself. Whereas the benefit of the nation and of the greater good had a
significant pull during the pre-polarized years, beginning in the late 1970s and
only becoming increasingly intense during the 1990s and even more so after
the turn of the century, trade was no longer and economic issue; politics was
once again king.
The juxtaposition of the two most critical pieces of trade legislation in
the early 1990s illustrates the degree to which differences between parties had
eroded — an implicit agreement beginning in the 1950s and lasting
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throughout the 1970s was that both parties would support broad trade
agreements while battling over the specifics of the legislation. The two bills
were the 1993-94 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations for the GATT in1994. While both
represented trade liberalizing measures, the bitter battle for the inclusion of
strict labor and environmental provisions in the NAFTA legislation brought
about war over its passage whereas the Uruguay Round, which avoided such
discussions, drew support from both sides of the isle, yet still faced some
opposition. This difference in responses to two trade liberalizing measures
shows the importance of the labor debate to the American political climate.63
In terms of labors role in trade, there was no stronger emergence of the
movement into the forefront of American policy than in the 1990s NAFTA
debates and their trade liberalization aftermath. Many trade policy historians
agree, such as Destler who wrote, in his subdued tone, that, “The early 1990s
were big years for American trade policy.”64 The decade began with a very
contentious debate over the passage of Fast Track negotiating authority, the
passage of which was a critical requirement that had the ability to make the
NAFTA agreement impossible. The pressure to institute and quicken trade
liberalization in the United States came directly from American businesses.
The trade situation became increasingly favorable to American based
corporations as the dollar index fell; subsequently, the trade deficit finally
decreased below $100 billion, promping American business to demand
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increased opportunities to take advantage of this favorability by opening up
markets.
In addition, a new concept was beginning to be felt around the world
and strongly in the United States among American manufacturing — labor
mobility. Much of the NAFTA debate, as far as organized labor organizations
are concerned, revolved around the increasingly important and globalization
driven concept of labor mobility, also known as outsourcing. Labor mobility
is defined as the ability to move jobs around the country and around the globe
in order to take advantage of different business environments which offer
more favorable production scenarios for a company. In the increasingly
globalized world of the early 1990s, this business maneuver threatened to
expand. American labor knew that with cheaper labor in Asia and, more
importantly for NAFTA, in our neighbor Mexico, they had to make a stand
against Fast Track negotiating authority and focus efforts against NAFTA or
else their constituents would most assuredly be at risk.
Fast Track renewal was a pivotal first step for the Bush administration
which was trying to tie up the NAFTA legislation, all the while knowing that
it would likely reside with the next administration to decide whether NAFTA
would pass or fail. Senators Bentson and Rostenkowski, who were both
supporters of the Fast Track authority renewal, wrote to President Bush asking
him for guarantees on three major issues before they would push hard for
renewal. The three issues they saw as being necessary to any argument on the
NAFTA trade deal and that would be pivotal in getting Democrats to consider
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the bill were: the overall economic impact of NAFTA, the effects that the
legislation might have on jobs and worker’s rights, and its impact on the
environment.65 Organized labor interests were particularly worried about
having a free trade agreement with a “low-wage” neighbor and questioned the
effects that it might have on the already hard struck and dwindling
manufacturing sector in the United States. Senator Gephardt tried to approach
the NAFTA deal with an open mind, and stated that he was undeclared;
however, the strong labor forces that were working behind the scenes forced
him to also write a letter to President Bush with similar concerns.
The labor unions were out hard and strong on the NAFTA issue, and
as had become the norm for powerful organized labor, they refused to
compromise. They were making a huge stand while business interests,
lobbyists and pro-traders lagged just enough behind to put them at a
disadvantage in the beginning. Trying to resist organized labor and equalize
the field, Bentson and Rostenkowski pushed hard for business leaders to start
making a move, and it wasn’t long until the pro-trade coalition that had ruled
for so long, but had been in decline during the Reagan deficit years, was back
in business and pushing hard. “Bentson and Rowstenkowski declared their
satisfaction with the White House response. On 9 May Gephardt declared his
support with a “caveat: If the administration sends to this Congress a trade
treaty that trades away American jobs, or … (allows the) abuse of (foreign)
workers, we can, and we will, amend it, or reject it.”66 When President Bush’s
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Fast Track authority pertaining to NAFTA arose as a topic of consideration,
the votes came down in both a partisan and regional manner. Democrats in the
House voted overwhelmingly against the Fast Track measure, 170 to 91,
although the leadership in the House supported Fast Track authority (a trend
which would repeat itself during the George W. Bush administration).
“Republicans were overwhelmingly positive about the NAFTA negotiations;
Clinton’s party was divided but leaning against, as reflected in House
Democrats’ 170-91 vote against Fast Track in May 1991.”67 Regionally, the
states with the highest Latino populations (California, Florida, and Texas)
voted 64-24 in favor of Fast Track, likely due to the fact that with a Fast Track
victory, the passage of NAFTA was greatly assisted. It should be noted that
the Fast Track battle laid the ground work for the NAFTA battle as it brought
out the special interests that would remain in top performance throughout the
NAFTA debate. Even though the protrude interests were slower to rise up and
counter the protectionist forces, when they did finally emerge, they came out
strong, opening up the checkbooks to succeed.68
Although NAFTA was negotiated under the George H. W. Bush
Administration, its passage and effects would become a true facet and battle
for the Clinton administration. Clinton, the first Democrat in over a decade,
came into office with huge trade concerns. He was forced to immediately
decide whether to make void all of the efforts of the previous administration
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in terms of NAFTA, or to support and appease his organized labor
constituency by either amending the agreement or dropping it all together.
However, Clinton’s position on NAFTA was hidden at first. In
October 1992, before he was elected in November, Clinton came out strong
for NAFTA, endorsing it and rejecting the idea the agreement needed to be
renegotiated in a speech leading up to the election. However, he did protect
his interests by declaring that the current NAFTA draft was insufficient in
dealing with the environment, worker standards and the threat of import
surges.69 Even when he entered office, there was still room to question
whether he was going to be pro-trade with the strong backing of American
business and special interests or whether he was going to side with his
organized labor-funded party. In his initial months, Clinton gave free trade
speech in February 1993, and in March he appeared to be supporting a steep
rise in tariffs on minivan imports. In April, he appeared to revert back the
protectionist leanings of his party when he chose organizational appointments
which put him on board with managed trade—he chose a “cautious trade”
activist, Laura Tyson, as the chair of his Council of Economic Advisors. This
appointment was a shock as his predecessors, among both parties, had
historically appointed traditional free trade advocates to this position.70
Clinton entered office with the promise that he would pass NAFTA
with, and only with, enhanced side agreements for labor and the environment.
However, in the administration as a whole, he took a lot of risks surrounding
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the agreement. After looking at the proceedings surrounding President
Obama’s approach to both the stimulus package and the healthcare bill, it
seems weird that President Clinton supported and prompted members of his
own party to make any comments that they deemed as necessary in terms of
the NAFTA debate, especially before the side agreements had been worked
out. Many observers saw this as the fact that the Clinton Administration was
supportive of trade but trying to simultaneously protect the organized labor
backing of Democratic elected officials. However, Bob Woodward thought
that Clinton’s early approach to NAFTA was a bad sign for the agreement. In
a book he wrote about the Clinton White House he wrote, “…the odds were
that the Clinton administration would abandon NAFTA because the labor
groups opposed it.”71
Clinton’s chosen United States Trade Representative (USTR) Mickey
Kantor, who entered the position with a blank record on trade, thought
otherwise, saying, “that if Clinton fought for Congressional approval of the
treaty and won despite the opposition of labor and of some members of the
House leadership, it would be a big plus for him. He would have stood up and
fought a bipartisan fight.”72 However, some members of his party resented
this action and it left plenty of room for organized labor and for the engaging
businessman, a political newcomer in 1992, Ross Perot, to join in the trade
debate.
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Clinton’s pro-NAFTA stance was attacked outright before he took office
as well. Ross Perot’s ideas, which were popularized in his 1992/1996
presidential election runs, stand out as the most significant opposition. Perot
busted into the public scene as a wealthy businessman who could successfully
appeal to the thoughts and ideas of middle class America. He is important to
point out because it was his campaign in 1992 which took on the role of
almost being like the electoral voice of organized labor and their constituents.
As an Independent, he belonged to neither political side, but his trade ideas
fell almost squarely with the most left-leaning of the Democratic Party.
Although, in a Larry King Live debate with Al Gore, Perot declared
himself to be a free-trader, his book, entitled Save Your Job, Save Our
Country: NAFTA Must Be Stopped Now!, speaks to the contrary. In his book,
he wrote that NAFTA would create “a giant sucking sound” and would mean
the “loss of millions of jobs” which would be pulled Southward over the
border to Mexico in order to take advantage of the cheap labor and poorly
enforced labor standards. He brought the argument to America’s doorstep
stating that no less than one-third of all U.S. manufacturing employment (six
million of the 18 million total jobs) would be at risk if NAFTA passed.73 With
his successful campaign in 1992, garnering 18% of the popular vote and
taking an even 38% of the vote away from both Clinton and Bush, Perot was
the most successful third party candidate since Teddy Roosevelt and forced
the Clinton Administration to protect itself by amending its platform to better
protect its middle-class constituents who were now fearful of the labor effects
73
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of NAFTA.74 However, as can be seen in the results, shown below, in a
Gallup poll conducted April 4, 1991, the majority of Americans still supported
NAFTA as being beneficial for the United States.
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While the Clinton Administration supported NAFTA and outlined its
benefits to American businesses and society as a whole, organized labor
interests threw their weight against the agreement. The Clinton administration
praised NAFTA, saying that it would lead to the creation of hundreds of
thousands of well-paying American jobs and that it would expand the U.S.
economy by $100-$200 billion per annum. 76 To a large degree this has been
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vindicated as NAFTA has greatly expanded U.S. trade between Canada and
Mexico.
However, labor organizations, who represented the workers who were
most likely to lose their jobs and lacked the skills to attain the “well-paying”
jobs NAFTA would create, were not blinded by this economic growth
potential. Organized labor supplied the muscle to the anti-NAFTA side of the
argument. With their membership in great decline and wages and productivity
falling proportionally every year on end the unions and their constituents saw
the opening of trade with Mexico as a serious threat that should be considered
as an immediate concern. The AFL-CIO, America’s second largest union but
easily the most politically charged on trade and outsourcing concerns, and its
member unions approached many of the Democratic Congressmen who
remained on the fence or in favor of NAFTA to make a stand against the
agreement, making it clear that NAFTA was going to be considered as a test
of legislators fidelity to worker’s and labor’s causes. The lobbying by labor
unions caused enough Congressmen to sign onto the anti-NAFTA side that
Clinton’s Budget Director, Leon Panetta, declared NAFTA, “dead in the
water.”77
The Democratic leadership was split on the NAFTA vote. Similar to
the Fast Track vote, it soon became clear that the real battle for passage of the
NAFTA legislation was going to be in the House. While Speaker Thomas
Foley (D-WA) supported the bill, if not enthusiastically, Majority Leader
Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) was leaning against the bill and Majority Whip
77
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David Bonior (D-Mich), the number three Democrat in the House, outright
opposed it. Bonior and Gephardt were concerned by the lack of worker’s right
provisions and by the obvious incentives that the legislation gave to
employers to outsource both their labor and their operations to Mexico. When
labor and the environment side agreements were finally agreed upon, the run
to the end had begun, and labor was still in opposition.
Upon the passage of the side agreements, the administration pushed
hard to get NAFTA passed. On September 14, 1993 President Clinton invited
three former presidents, from both parties, to the White House in order to talk
about the NAFTA agreement. In a speech delivered the same day, President
Clinton pointed to the recent global trade and economic changes saying that
NAFTA or no NAFTA, “the debate about NAFTA centers on whether we will
embrace these changes and create the jobs of tomorrow, or try to resist these
changes, hoping that we can preserve the economic structures of yesterday.”78
The administration insisted that NAFTA was the way forward and that it
would create U.S. jobs while buttressing global competitiveness. However,
proving that to his fellow Democrats was a far more difficult task, and the
Republicans were demanding that the Democrats produce 100 “yea” votes,
nine more than the amount that responded positively to Fast Track. 79
However, the administration was running into a brick wall, a wall
formed by organized labor. With the strong push by labor unions, Clinton was
finding it difficult to meet with legislators who were willing to make a stand
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to support NAFTA, causing Clinton to lash out at labor unions. However,
Clinton saw that he needed to get at least some labor unions on board in order
to win over enough Democrats to allow passage. The administration decided
to focus on the easier to appease car manufacturers and textiles, two groups
which as we have seen have been targeted in the past as well. The big three
automakers won a 62.5% North American content requirement which made it
more difficult for foreign automakers to produce in Mexico or Canada and
simply ship into the U.S. market without any restraints. This was particularly
directed at Japan whose auto industry had been the brunt of many quotas and
tariffs. Textiles won similar protections as they were given during the
Kennedy Round. The reward for textiles support was the “triple
transformation test” which meant that the fabric had to be produced in North
America, from North American-produced yarn which was made from North
American grown fibers. 80
After the inclusion of these provisions, Clinton was able to secure the
necessary votes for passage. The final NAFTA vote was 234-200, and the
breakdown was 102 Democrats and 132 Republicans in support. The reason
that the Democrats were able to pick up the extra 11 votes was almost entirely
due to the inclusion of the “cotton Democrats”. These 11 swing votes came
primarily from Southern Democrats who were in textile heavy districts,
making the fiber agreement pivotal to the passage of NAFTA. Another pivotal
aspect, which allowed some labor interests to get behind NAFTA, was the
inclusion of adjustment aide to displaced workers and a promise that the
80
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administration would work hard to enforce Mexico’s lacking labor standards.
However, the side agreement lacked any true enforcement mechanism,
meaning that people continue to criticize the side agreement saying that it
lacked teeth. “By contrast, under NAFTA’s side agreement on labor,
complaints about freedom of association in trade sectors can trigger an
investigations and ministerial consultations, but there is no provision for an
independent expert committee to resolve and issue or for any sanction if a
complaint is verified.”81 While many continue to attack NAFTA for allegedly
causing the loss of American jobs, as will be seen in the 2006 and 2008
elections, NAFTA is the primary reason why Canada and Mexico are the
number one and two, respectively, trading partners of the United States.
During the period between 1987 and 2000 the aggregate amount of U.S. trade
tripled due primarily to the increased trade between the three countries.

V. The Lasting Influence of the 2006, and 2008 Elections?
A. 2006
1. The Election Results
The 2006 election was a watershed mark in the brief but eventful
history of fair trade advocacy and represented as great a sea change in
Congressional party control as the “Republican Revolution” in 1994. If there
remained anyone who believed that the issue of fair trade and trade in general
was not a salient topic in the mainstream political culture, they were proven
wrong by the events of the 2006 midterm election.
81
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The 2006 election was the culmination of over 20 years of polarization
and politicization of the trade issue, starting in late 1970s. Not only was trade
a salient issue, but in states across the United States, from the Northeast to the
South, to the hard hit industrial Midwest and the Asian trade gateway that is
the Western United States, trade was an important point of contention and
formed the base of several campaign’s platforms which unseated a number of
well-known anti-fair trade legislators like Ohio’s former Senator Mike
DeWine, or Pennsylvania’s Rick Santorum. With the Democrats taking back
control of the House and gaining a strong footing that carried into 2008 in the
Senate, the concept of free trade without labor requirements or provisions
embedded in the agreement started a decline, a decline to where and how
much of a decline still remains to be seen. However, while the transition was
celebrated and touted by liberal fair trade groups and labor unions across the
country, it is difficult to pinpoint such monumental policy changes to coincide
with the Democratic transition.
The American public, which has for much of U.S. history favored a
slightly more protectionist path, in hard hit districts across the country voiced
their approval of fair trade and in turn, stronger labor rights provisions in trade
with their 2006 vote. According to the protectionist, fair trade group Public
Citizen, who did an extensive report on the 2006 election results as far as fair
trade support is concerned, showed a net increase; meaning that a former free
trade advocate was beaten in the general election by a fair trade activist, or
that the empty seat of a retiring free trade proponent was snatched up by a fair
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trader for 30 seats in the House of Representatives-11 were open-seat pickups,
and seven Senate seats, of which only one was an open-seat pickup.82
Ohio was likely the biggest example of a fair trade change in trade
policy being a strong campaign issue. All of the seats that were open or being
contested in Ohio were won by fair trade advocates touting a message of a
change on trade toward the inclusion of labor rights and seeking to bring
American jobs back home. Candidates in these hard-hit districts, many of the
most effected being in Ohio and Michigan, used trade heavily in order to press
their platform of change and hope for a better future where American jobs
return to this country—a promise that has yet to be proven possible given the
increasingly interdependent and globalized world.
Ohio was not the only state that showed to be a strong anti-free trade
petri dish. The United States has lost over three million jobs in the
manufacturing sector, representing one in six manufacturing jobs, during the
NAFTA-WTO decade while at the same time, real wages have stagnated.
According to a 2006 report by Economic Policy Institute, the state of Ohio,
itself, has lost a net 50,000 jobs as a result of NAFTA.83 This is the backbone
of reasons why eight in 10 voters called the economy “very important” to their
2006 House vote, and of those who said it was “extremely important”, about
40% were registered Democrats and many more were Independents whose
vote has been coveted in nearly all recent elections.84 When it came to the
issue of jobs, nearly all voters said that creating jobs was important for the
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United States and many were concerned about the loose trade agreements that
have been negotiated that included little binding labor stipulations and
allowed businesses to offshore their jobs and turn unheard-of profits at the
expense of domestic workers.
Voters view the government as being fundamentally responsible for
not requiring more from its trading partners, as well as allowing them to
continue to have little or very lenient labor laws that give other countries a
comparative advantage in manufacturing, and allowing the off-shoring of jobs
to continue, if not increase. Eighty-seven percent of voters were concerned
about off-shoring jobs, and of those who were concerned, 81% gave the
government a C, D, or F grade in handling it.85 In another 2006 poll, 71% said
that they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who spoke about offshoring of jobs, trade deficits, and creating jobs, arguments which made up
the backbone of fair trade Democratic candidate platforms. 86
2. The Effects of the Election
While much has been said about the results of the 2006 election, and in
fact it was a dramatic victory across the board for members of the fair trade
coalition, it is very unclear if the election has produced any effects as far as
trade policy. Other than relatively inconsequentially worded arguments and an
apparent commitment to work on getting labor concessions in the form of a
requirement for trading partners to at least enforce their current labor laws and
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to make a concerted effort to push toward the adoption of the five core ILO
principles, into any and all future trade agreements.87
The split that exists within the Democratic Party on the issues of trade,
and specially labor, are still very visible. Among the Democratic senators and
representatives there are two sides emerging, the new and recent members of
the party coalition who tend to be more aligned with the fair trade movement,
and many longer-term members of Congress who certainly do not align with
the growing base of their party, like Senator Max Baucus (D-MT.), Speaker of
the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY)
all support an expanded trade platform.88 It is interesting to see that those who
are in high-ranking office within the party did not, after the 2006 election,
coalesce with this burgeoning group of new fair trade Democrats, and with
few exceptions, maintained the idea that trade is good for all Americans and
the future of our government. It is these facts that have called into question
whether the large and growing fair trade core in the Democratic Party will
actually amount to that drastic of a change in trade policy, or be more
representative of the times, existing as a symbol rather than a catalyst.
One of the strongest arguments involving labor and trade was the lack
of negotiating labor provisions in the FTAs negotiated during the George W.
Bush administration. This battle created an intense debate in the summer of
2007 when Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expired. TPA allowed the
president and the United States Trade Representative to negotiate trade
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agreements which would be submitted to Congress for a strict up or down
vote without the possibility of amendments. This is the reason why, under the
George W. Bush Administration, eight free trade agreements were negotiated
and passed, and the frameworks for three others -South Korea, Columbia, and
Panama-were negotiated.
On May 10th 2007, the second Bush Administration met with
Democratic and Republican leaders in an attempt to reinvigorate the TPA
discussion with the hopes of passing an extension of TPA. While there was a
general consensus among the participants that TPA needed to be reinstated,
the language on the labor and environmental regulations that should be part of
future trade agreements was vague at best and did not represent the growing
fair trade base of the Democratic Party. In a statement about the process, Rep.
Pelosi distributed a response saying, “Free trade must be fair trade. For that
reason, the inclusion of basic internationally recognized labor and
environmental standards in our trade agreements have been long-standing
Democratic priority. … Last November, Americans voted for a new direction,
and that includes a right direction on trade-where labor and environmental
standards are at least as valued as our financial interests.”89 While this may
have seemed like a victory for the burdensome lag that was developing
regarding how vast and far reaching the demands should be on our future
trading partners in terms of worker’s rights, the vague language of the
agreement and the minor changes to U.S. trade policy that it required left the
newly elected and past fair trade members feeling like they had not been
89
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included in the process. Once again, the powerful Democrats at the top of the
party had made an agreement out of line with the results of the election even
thought Speaker Pelosi cited the election results in her speech.
In the wake of the 2006 election, Democrats proceeded to score only
limited victories, and in the process, caused a more pronounced split within
the party. Coming into office with the promise that they were going to change
the way that trade was done in Washington, the only real changes that were
felt between 2006 and the 2008 election was the agreement to push for
stronger labor rights in the form of the adoption and adherence to the general
principles of the ILO fundamental worker’s rights; a requirement that FTAmember countries enforce and uphold their labor laws, and the addition of
labor rights language into the negotiated Peru FTA which passed in late 2007.
In the process, the split between the two factions in the party became more
pronounced.
Even after the addition of the labor amendments, no matter if they
were as vast as many Democrats hoped for, the final vote on the Peru FTA
(see appendix I) showed the divide quite possibly better than any other
document or report could have. In the House, while the vote was 285-132 in
favor of the amended agreement, the Democrats split in their approval with
109 supporting the trade promotion agreement and 116 opposing, with eight
not voting. It is interesting and very telling to point out that the margin within
the Democratic Party was tighter than the number of members not voting. It is
more telling that the leadership, Speaker Pelosi, Congressman Rangel-who is
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in charge of trade in the House, Congressman Hoyer (D-MD), Representative
Dingell, and Representative Frank (D-MA) (representing five of the six most
powerful Democrats in the House according to Congress.org’s power
rankings) voted in favor of the agreement while 16 of the 19 new fair trade
representatives, who defeated former anti-fair traders, voted against it.
Going into the 2008 election year, the Democratic Party was split over
trade and especially over how powerful the labor provisions should be. For the
party leaders at the top, they demanded labor be a part of the discussion and
called for increasing labor regulations and laws, but were more willing to not
require the drastic labor changes that the new members were calling for if it
meant that an FTA could be passed and put into effect.
B. 2008 and a New Democratic President
If 2006 marked a watershed election on the issue of labor rights in
trade, than it only lasted two years since the 2008 election was a tsunami. The
results of the 2008 election are finally being realized, and although the
changes that come out of the election might be less than originally thought,
the power and saliency that the issue of labor rights in trading agreements
commanded during and immediately after the election can still be felt today.
Not only was trade an issue in both Congressional and the presidential races,
but it was a winning issue in both. Voters across America went to the polls on
November 5th, 2008, and by the end of the night, the United States looked
prepared to follow a new path in terms of trade and a decidedly stricter
requirement of trading partners on the issue of labor rights.
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Outsourcing jobs and the failures of NAFTA and other trading
agreements to help workers in this country maintain their jobs in the face of
fierce and unfair competition in the developing world was a main focus of
both politicians and labor organizations. According to the election analysis
done by Public Citizen, trade was the main focus of over 137 different paid
advertisements that aired during the election season (only 25 aired in 2006
which was a marked increase over any of the past elections). Twelve of those
advertisements were for candidate Obama’s campaign.90
Beating up on and attacking the NAFTA agreement became the cool
thing to do and a winning stance when large numbers of workers began
feeling the pinch of a cooling market heading for economic catastrophe.
Across the country, Democrats climbed over each other to see who could be
the most critical of our trading agreements and about how they were going to
save American jobs by requiring more regulations from our trading partners.
However, it is unfair to say that only the Democratic Party was attacking
NAFTA and past failed U.S. agreements. In 18 races, the GOP ran on the
issues of failed trade and in 14 races both parties ran strongly on fair trade
(including labor rights) or fairer trade.91 In California’s 52nd District, a
historically GOP-heavy seat that was being vacated by Rep. Duncan Hunter
who was an advent fair trader was taken over by, his son, Duncan Hunter Jr.,
who was elected to fill the seat ran on a strong labor rights and fair trade
platform. Hunter Jr. said on the campaign trail that, “our nation needs to adopt
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a policy of Fair Trade that encourages the development of overseas markets,
while protecting our industry and workers from unfair competition from
countries like China, that flood our market with inferior, sometimes dangerous
products produced in near-slave labor conditions.”92
Due to the presidential election, the fight against trade and for labor
was stronger than ever since; like in 2004, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and
a few other hard-hit states had the potential to choose the next president. Both
parties were listening closely. Polling that was done leading up to the 2008
election showed that a majority of all Americans, including a majority of
Republicans demand changes to the current path toward unrestricted free
trade.93 The Democrats however, a party whose opinion on trade has been
shifting for over 50 years as the base of their party eroded due to globalization
and foreign competition, came out on top with their commitment to equalize
the playing field and bring home American jobs.
However, while there was much talk of amending or completely
revamping NAFTA in both the 2006 and 2008 elections, there remains a
question as to whether talk of revamping NAFTA amounts to more than
election-year stumping. Three-way trade has soared and unemployment in the
United Sates is substantially lower now than it was 14 years ago — 4.9% in
January 2008 compared with 6.6% in January 1994. American shoppers have
benefited from lower prices on imported goods, and U.S.-based multinational
companies have boosted their competitiveness by whittling production costs.
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Yet there is growing wariness among the public that the United States
is giving away more than it's getting. After all, the nation has lost 3.1 million
manufacturing jobs since 1994, and its trade deficit with Mexico and Canada
has risen to $138.5 billion in 2008 from $9.1 billion in 1993.94
It was becoming clear to politicians, at least surrounding the time of
the election, that promoting free trade with countries that have hopelessly
unequal labor laws, conditions, and treatment is a losing platform during hard
times. A Fortune Magazine poll taken Jan. 14-16, 2008 showed that voters
have clearly identified who they think has won and who has lost within the
free-trade agenda. Nearly half of those polled believe that the unbalanced
growth in international trade has made things better for consumers, but 55%
believe American business has been harmed, and 78% think it has made
things worse for the American worker.95
The problem for the Democratic Party is not about how to find a
salient stance on trade that gets them elected and appeals to the American
public, they have found that and the 2006 and 2008 elections spell that out
clearly. It has been a problem with how far they should push without
jeopardizing the gentle fabric of international trade. To answer this problem
one could talk at length on any number of issues, but after looking at what has
come out of the last two elections, where the words “fair trade” and “labor
rights” seemed to be thrown around so much that they went from wonkish
jargon to dinner table lingo, the American public is calling for their elected
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representative to help them make a stand against unequal competition in the
developing world. The fact that there has been only one trading agreement
passed since the Democrats took back control of the House shows that
Congress is treading lightly so as to not scare away potential trading partners,
but at the same time find a middle ground on labor rights that will suit both
countries.
While leaders in the Democratic Party are feeling out how far they can
push the issue of labor in trade, the newly elected members of both the House
and Senate are finding out that the more things change the more they stay the
same. Although there are new names scattered around the Capitol and a
different party is in complete control of the reigns of policy making in
Washington, the only real thing that has happened on the issue of labor in
trading agreements this decade is the 2002 Trade Act and the May 10th
agreement with their commitments to place labor requirements in all new
trade agreements with enforcement mechanisms, as well as a recent slowdown
in the process of FTA making. The slowdown likely signals that USTR Kirk
and Congressional leaders on trade are discussing ways to amend the
proposed agreements so that a majority Democratic Congress would be able to
support them. The deals with Panama, Columbia, and South Korea will be
passed during the Obama presidency, but without major changes to the labor
section of the Columbia FTA and a strong and honest commitment on part of
Columbian President Uribe, the measure will stall and it may take much
longer than trade advocates would like.
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C. How will President Obama Effect the Role of Labor Rights in Trade?
1. Candidate Obama and the road to the White House
President Barack Obama is apparently learning the delicate flip-flog
maneuver as he now is changing his tune on some of the things that he said
during the campaign trail and especially in the primary slugfest with now
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Both Democratic candidates had far
reaching demands of American trading partners and international commerce
in general during the primary in terms of labor rights and the plight of
American manufacturing. Then candidate Obama was very outspoken about
his plans to introduce labor rights into all future and pending trade
agreements. "We'll add binding obligations to protect the right to collective
bargaining and other core labor standards recognized by the International
Labor Organization. And I will add enforceable standards to NAFTA, the
World Trade Organization (WTO), CAFTA, and other Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) currently in effect."96
At a General Motors plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, in February 2008,
Obama said he, "will not sign another trade agreement unless it has
protections for our environment and protections for American workers"
(Council of Foreign Relations, #15492). Candidate Obama and candidate
Clinton both fought, like many Congressional candidates, over whose attacks
on NAFTA were strongest and most critical of the trading agreement signed
by President Clinton. NAFTA became an easy target for both candidates as
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the images of Mexican maquiladoras operating just across the border creating
clothing and other goods in less than ideal working conditions and for a
fraction of the wage of Americans working mere miles away were plastered
on TV sets, billboards, and in newspapers.
While speaking to packed convention centers and town halls across
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, Obama scorned the lack of enforceable
labor regulations in America’s trading agreements going back to the NAALC
side agreement on labor in NAFTA. In August of 2007 during a Democratic
debate, Obama said he would meet with the Canadian and Mexican presidents
to “try to amend NAFTA,” and said that the agreement “should reflect the
principle that our trade should not just be good for Wall Street, but should also
be good for Main Street.”97 Even after this, Obama pushed further in his
attempt to best fellow candidate Hillary Clinton saying in a February 2008
debate that he would "make sure that we renegotiate" NAFTA and use "the
hammer of a potential opt-out" of NAFTA as leverage to ensure enforceable
labor and environmental protections. The New York Times’ opinion page
summed up the NAFTA mudslinging events between the candidates perfectly,
saying, “criticisms of trade agreements in Ohio are as predictable as praise for
ethanol in Iowa.”98
Much of Obama’s attacks on NAALC where made in order to win the
much-coveted support of the countries strongest labor unions including the
AFL-CIO, AFSCME, and Teamsters, who he had done poorly with in the
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primaries with Hillary Clinton due to his less verbose support of renegotiation
and insertion of strict and enforceable labor concessions. However, winning
their support was done at the expense of fluidity on labor issues, including
within trading agreements. During the election cycle, it appeared that, with his
history of opposing trade agreements lacking labor rights restrictions, and his
campaign rhetoric, the international trade community was going to be forced
to react to an increasingly protectionist U.S. president driven to raise the issue
of labor rights and instill stricter regulations worldwide .
However, what is said in the process of winning votes does not always
translate into actual policy, a reality that seems to be coming true with respect
to Obama and the degree to which labor rights play a role in trading
agreements. President Obama and senior Democrats are picking their battles
when it comes to labor rights in trade, upholding their promises on some and
recoiling on others. Slippage on the labor issue and renegotiation of NAFTA
started before he was elected, when it was reported that Obama’s senior
economic adviser Austin Goolsbee, who now holds the role of chief
economist and staff director for the economic recovery advisory board, had
told officials in the Canadian government that Obama's strong rhetoric on
renegotiating NAFTA in order to include more enforceable labor provisions
was nothing more than talk, and that he was not planning on actually
renegotiating (Youngman, 2009). However, after getting banished from the
Obama campaign, Mr. Goolsbee is being vindicated since he, not Obama, was
telling the truth as to the intentions of the new president.
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Ron Kirk, the U.S. Trade Representative for the Obama administration
said at the Summit of the Americas that it is not necessary to renegotiate
NAFTA to follow through on Obama's campaign promise of making sure that
stronger labor provisions with better enforcement mechanisms make it into the
agreement. He said, "The president has said we will look at all options, but I
think they can be addressed without having to reopen the agreement"99 Both
Canadian President Stephen Harper and Mexican President Vicente Calderon,
supported this idea as they feared lessened trade with their largest trading
partner. However, Obama and the Democrats will have to balance the foreign
demands of trading partners and the labor demands from labor unions and
workers within the United States. Renegotiating NAFTA took a position on
the back burner though as Ron Kirk pushed the idea of voting on the other
trade agreements that remained in limbo, like Panama and the labor-focused,
hotly-debated Columbia Free Trade Agreement.
In addition to the talk on NAFTA, the Columbia FTA, which has
failed to pass since it was negotiated in 2006, has and will continue to be a
sticking point for the Democratic Party. Above all else, the Columbia FTA is
the one trade agreement whose passage is solely based upon labor provisions.
Almost all Democrats, including President Obama, stand defiant against the
agreement as currently negotiated. While it does contain some labor
provisions, the provision as written do little to force Columbia to take action
in dealing with the violence against labor leaders that rampages across the
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country. Although the Uribe government has taken steps to try to deal with the
violence and increase their labor rights in order to be viewed in a more
favorable light in the U.S. Congress, the Columbia FTA seems destined to not
gain ground.100 President Obama's stance on Columbia, like many other
Democrats is unyielding, and unlike the other labor concessions he has made
or seems poised to be able to accept, the labor violence and poor enforcement
capabilities of Columbia’s current laws makes blocking the FTA until stronger
labor standards and laws can be added a stronger platform on which to stand.
USTR Ron Kirk, who was a very strong proponent of free trade when
he was the mayor of Dallas, Texas, said that “the administration planned
expeditious reviews of pending trade agreement with Colombia.”101 He also
countered the call by many new fair trade Democrats and others in the party
by saying that Colombia had made “remarkable progress” in reducing
violence, and that while the attacks against labor activists do still occur, he
would enter into extensive discussions with Congress on the matter.102 Even
after Kirk committed himself to working toward its passage, Congressional
Democrats and labor groups in the United States have said that the Uribe
government must do more to stop the anti-labor violence and hold perpetrators
accountable, a position Mr. Obama supported during his campaign.103 Rep.
Mike Michaud, the leader of a group of 54, mostly Democrats, House
members responded to bringing the Columbia agreement to the House for a
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vote saying, "This is absolutely outrageous and a serious mistake."104 If the
White House submits the agreement to Congress, it will have to garner
support for the legislation from Republicans to get it approved, especially in
the House.
The Obama administration is being confronted with one of the most
difficult opening periods for a president, and the plethora of other issues on
Obama’s agenda may be pushing the promise of labor rights onto the back
burner. Congressional Democrats, as stated before, are torn on the issue of
labor rights having a role in trading agreements to the extent that labor
organizations and millions of unemployed former manufacturing workers
demand. President Obama has realized that he needs the support of the new,
large Democratic majorities in both houses to pass his agenda, and pushing
forward a strict and strong policy on labor would alienate members of
Congress and foreign officials in a time when trade has greatly diminished.
Due to the current economic conditions and the vastness of President
Obama’s agenda, it is still debatable whether labor rights or renegotiation of
NAFTA or the other trade pacts on the table, discussed below, will happen
this year or until next year after the midterm elections have occurred.
However, progress on the Columbia trade agreement (which has greater ties to
labor rights, and the issue of violence against labor unionists is tying up its
passage) is stalled and even though it is being aggressively advanced by
USTR Kirk, it will not likely reach floor debate until next year.
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IV.

The current Labor Heavy Trade Fights

After looking at the 2006 and 2008 elections and the election of President
Obama, it is important to dissect how the Democrats view and what they want
to occur in pending and upcoming trade agreements as far as labor rights is
concerned. According to Kimberly Elliot, formerly of the Peterson Institute
for International Economics, the inclusion of labor provisions in trade
agreements is primarily the result of the need to gain Congressional approval
for these agreements.105 With the Democrats now in power of both the
Executive and Legislative branches, it will be a requirement that a country’s
labor laws will have to be written and enforced as per the ILO’s fundamental
principles before, or at least during, negotiations of a trading agreement with
the United States. Many countries where FTAs with the United States have
been recently passed, negotiated, or coveted, such as Bahrain, Chile,
Guatemala, and Morocco, have all undertaken extensive reforms in terms of
their law laws in anticipation of negotiating FTAs or RTAs with the United
States. For example, Oman had a labor law that strictly restricted or made
illegal labor organizing, however, they made drastic changes to the law as a
condition of completing RTA negotiations with the United States.106
Currently, the United States has three RTAs pending-Columbia, Panama,
and South Korea-although labor rights arguments are at the heart of only the
Columbian RTA. In a recommitment to his promises made in his second State
of the Union Address in February, President Obama once again took up the
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trade expansionist banner and expressed a desire to complete the three free
trade agreements. In his address, Obama said that he would work to double
American exports over the next five years, and putting these agreements into
motion could go a long way in making this a reality. He recommitted to this in
a speech made on July 7, 2010 where he said that he would call on Congress
to make a strong push in renegotiating the stalled Panama and Columbia
agreements. This promise came after a similar speech made at the G20
summit in Toronto in June where President Obama pledged support and
pressure on the South Korean FTA.
Speaking from the east room of the White House, at an event which
was intended to highlight the efforts that the Administration had undertaken to
promote trade, Obama said, “For a long time, we were trapped in a false
political debate in this country, where business was on one side and labor was
on the other….what we now have an opportunity to do is to refocus our
attention where we’re all in it together.” He also made a pledge that he would
do everything in his power to “keep the playing field level” for American
companies that send their products overseas.107 This is important to a
Democratic president because as we have seen, trade is a particularly difficult
issue for many Democrats in the modern era due to the fact that there is a
strong union-influenced view that American workers suffer disproportionately
when the United States lowers trade barriers.
This pledge, coming in an election year brings on some more
challenges for Democratic legislators, especially those up for reelection.
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Manufacturing has been hit particularly hard by the global recession and it
may be difficult for legislators to support these agreements and be able to hold
the “Fair Trade” banner bestowed upon them by organized labor. The major
consternation on the South Korea pact revolves around the Democratic
concerns about South Korea’s restrictions on automobile and beef imports
from the United States. President Obama has vowed to address these concerns
before sending the agreement to Congress.
President Obama, who is under heavy pressure from business leaders,
does have some Democratic allies on the issue. After the president’s G-20
pledges on trade in Toronto, Representative Steny Hoyer, who is the House
Democratic Majority Leader, called for Obama to renegotiate all three stalled
pacts and send them to Congress. Those in the House leadership are often the
biggest trade proponents among the Democratic Party. The rest of the party is
mixed in their support, and is heavily dependent on their location and whether
it is amid America’s manufacturing and organized labor heavy areas.
In order to renegotiate the pact in a labor friendly, but politically
feasible way, Obama appointed 18 corporate and labor leaders, including chief
executives from Ford Motor and Walt Disney, to a council to advise him on
the pacts. The White House has also noted that there has been a 17 percent
increase in American exports during the first four months of 2010, compared
with the same period from 2009, showing that the economy may be pulling
out of the recession and American manufacturing is bouncing back, even if
that is a reserved rebound. “We’re upping our game for the playing field of
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the 21st century, … But we’ve got to do it together. We’ve got to all row in
the same direction.”108 The true test will be how the Democrats renegotiate the
pacts and how they write labor concerns into any future trading pacts.
Under a precedent set in the 1990s, any future trading agreements will
likely have a labor section that is very similar to the labor section in the U.S.Jordan FTA. Therefore, in order to understand the future labor rights
discussions that will occur, it is important that we briefly look at the Jordan
agreement before moving onto the real conflict as far as labor is concerned,
Columbia.
V.

Columbia:
While Colombia has ratified all eight of the International Labor

Organization’s (ILO) fundamental conventions, they have failed to ensure the
safety of union leaders and failed to enforce the laws currently in place.109
Speaking about Columbia in a March 2008 speech, Obama said he would
oppose a FTA with Columbia because, "the violence against unions in
Colombia would make a mockery of the very labor protections that we have
insisted be included in these kinds of agreements." In a report published by
the U.S. Department of State in March 2006, they wrote of Colombian trade
unionists who are forced to endure selective, systematic, and persistent
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violence perpetrated primarily by illegal armed groups for both political and
financial reasons. It further stated that the violence and anti-union
discrimination that is being perpetrated causes workers to balk at joining a
union and engaging in union activities.110 An Embassy of Colombia report to
the United States in 2007, stated that there was a two-thirds decline in murders
of trade unionists since 2002, and that this decrease was largely due to the
greatly increased amount of resources and initiatives that Columbian President
Uribe’s administration has put into effect to deal with the problem.
The Columbian government and President Uribe enacted the National
Development Plan in order to protect labor union members, their families, and
other groups at their homes, at work and in public.111
However, other sources suggest that violence against trade unionists
has continued to occur with only relatively small decreases due to the fact that
perpetrators have been able to act with little fear of punishment. In reports to
the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations from Colombian trade unionists and also as presented
separately by the International Trade Union Conference, 95 to 99 percent of
cases concerning anti-union violence are claimed to go unpunished.112
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Table1
Colombia’s Progress against Violence, 2002-2007
2002

2007

Change

Common homicides

28,837

17,180

-40%

Civilians assasinated
by illegal armed groups

2,087

358

-83%

Trade unionists killed

205

25

-88%

Kidnappings

2,882

515

-82%

Total terrorist attacks

1,645

381

Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Social Protection.

-77%
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It is due to the fact that many of these crimes and violence are not
prosecuted and even more are not reported that the Democrats are blocking the
Columbia FTA. In a letter speaking about the progess of the Columbia FTA from
Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca), Rep. Steny Hoyer, Rep. Charles Rangel, and Rep.
Sander Levin on June 29, 2007 said, “There is widespread concern in Congress
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about the level of violence in Colombia, the impunity, the lack of investigations
and prosecutions, and the role of the paramilitary. Issues of this nature cannot
solely be resolved through language in a trade agreement. We believe there must
first be concrete evidence of sustained results on the ground in Colombia, and
members of Congress will continue working with all interested parties to help
achieve this end before consideration of any FTA. Consequently, we cannot
support the Colombia FTA at this time.”114 The majorities of Democrats in both
Houses remain uneasy about Columbia and still doubt the progress that
Colombian President Uribe has touted. President Uribe has played host, on a
number of occasions, to visiting legislators; although, most of the visits have been
done by Republican supporters of the legislation who are met with glowing
examples of how far Columbia has come as far as labor rights. However,
Democrats are quick to point out that President Uribe has spent millions of
dollars on public relations campaigns, lobbying firms, and the visiting legislators
rarely, if ever, get to speak to labor unionists115.
As for when and if the Columbia FTA movement will be reignited, little
evidence remains on how much President Obama and legislative Democrats will
require from the Columbian government in exchange for its passage. USTR Kirk
has made bringing the Columbia FTA out of legislative purgatory, reviving it,
and passing the FTA one of his chief priorities for this legislature which will end
early in 2011. With Obama’s newly granted support and backing, it certainly
makes a potential passage before the end of this legislature more feasible, but the
likelihood that Democrats will take a stand on the Columbia agreement with
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many of them fighting for their political lives remains very unlikely for the
remainder of the year. So without significant Obama support, above and far
beyond this pledge, it seems more likely that the Columbia FTA will be an
element that will be left until after the midterm elections and to the next
Congress, one which many seem to think may include more conservative voices.

VI. The Future of Labor and Trade, Where Will Go Next
A) What path ought we take between trade and labor?
This paper has already laid out the historical frameworks dictating how we
arrived at our current position at the apex of labor organizations, trade policy,
and the transition of the Democratic Party. It seems fitting then to tackle the
issues and consequences of this direction we appear to be heading and analyze
the actions that the federal government could and should take which would be
most advantageous for Americans in the aggregate and our trading partners in
the long run. Based on the complex interests of both labor organizations and
free trade advocates, there is no easy way to spell out exactly what should be
done in all cases. There is no magical formula that will allow for a choice
what is best for all Americans and for foreigners alike, however, if history is
any evidence, and as has been shown it undoubtedly is, trade expansion is
better for the interests of America and Americans than protectionist, traderestricting policies.
Trade benefits Americans, but not equally, creating a situation where
trade expansion is the best unfeasible option. According to the United States
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Trade Representative, trade has expanded U.S. annual incomes by more than
$1 trillion since 1945, meaning that, by disaggregating this figure by
population estimates, every U.S. household has gained $9,000 in income
based on this trade expansion.116 Also according to the USTR, while speaking
at a Senate Finance Committee meeting on February 15, 2007, USTR Susan
Schwab said that expanding free trade and following a greatly expanded trade
liberalization agenda would cause the GDP of the United States to increase by
a further $500 billion. This would assuredly enable American companies to be
able to compete in foreign markets, creating jobs and propping the vital
bottom lines of U.S. companies who have slipped during the current global
economic recession.
Seeing the paradox that lies ahead, the following presents a
nonpartisan and nonaligned look at just a sampling of the programs which
could be expanded or created, which would have the effect of serving the best
interests of all parties involved. In particular, the elements that most free
traders see as a way that trade liberalization can continue even in the face of
union opposition are as follows: a greatly expanded and more effective Trade
Adjustment Assistance program, an expanded retraining program in more
skilled professions which are trade resistant, increased access and affordability
of places of higher education for all citizens, but especially those whose jobs
have been downsized or outsourced due to increased international trade, and a
corporate driven commitment to instituting basic labor rights.
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An expanded Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program could be the
element which allows Americans to support an expanded trade platform. It
seems like an obvious idea that if all Americans can benefit from an expanded
trade platform, that the winners in the trade game should compensate the
losers for their sacrifices to the common good. TAA was created as an
element of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, and while it was
expanded in the 1970s, it still lacks a certain element of efficiency and
effectiveness.
The purpose of TAA was, and is, to act as a buyout of American
workers in exchange for their tacit acceptance of outsourcing and the isolated
negative employment aspects of trade liberalization. “When asked if
government assistance for workers hurt by trade would affect their views on
whether LDCs should be given greater access to the American market, twothirds of respondents said that they would now support free trade, up from 36
percent before they were informed about the economic effects of
protectionism and 50 percent when informed about the negative economic
implications of protectionism.”117 While effective in this element, the idea of a
buyout of American workers to essentially get them to not complain does not
solve the problem, it only adds to the growing welfare state in the United
States. According to the Department of Labor, the current TAA program
“offers a variety of benefits and services to eligible workers, including job
training, income support, job search and relocation allowances, a tax credit to
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help pay the costs of health insurance, and a wage supplement to certain
reemployed trade-effected workers 50 years of age and older.”118
While all of these elements are indeed beneficial to displaced workers,
TAA is not distributed according to the policies which govern its use.
According to a study by Robert Baldwin in 1980, a system of compensation
such as TAA does exist in many countries that face the similar problems of
the isolated negative effects of trade liberalization. Baldwin is quick to point
out, however, that none of these programs fully compensates those who are
affected, like in the United States, based on the fact that many of these plans
require expensive administration to determine who gets compensated and at
what levels.119In order to qualify for TAA, a certain threshold must be met
stating that the major reasons that the person was let go or whose job was
shifted must have been due to outsourcing and/or trade aspects and not other
elements which often lead to one losing his/her job.
This is more difficult to prove that one would assume and thus, many
individuals who should be granted TAA privileges are never given any form
of compensation, and many who should not be eligible for assistance are
awarded benefits. It should be further noted that as Baldwin states, “there is
evidence suggesting that … [these unemployment benefits] may make
employers more willing to lay off worker and encourage those who do lose
their jobs to remain unemployed for longer periods than otherwise.”120 It is in
this last point where the main flaw of the program resides; it does not
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adequately transition formerly employed workers into newer expanding
careers, but helps them remain unemployed or to move into similar career
paths in other areas or in other markets, which are often also jeopardized by
trade, perpetuating the problems that were inherent to begin with.
In order to combat these challenges, TAA should be offered as a bonus
payment on top of unemployment assistance but should be more of a
retraining and reeducation program than a compensation program which can
last for more than a year. If TAA was made to be more of a reeducation
program, workers could be able to easily transition into growing careers,
bringing them back the dignity of being employed and removing them from
the burdens of the U.S. government, allowing trade to blossom and the deficit
to be reduced. However, this can only be accomplished by working on making
higher education in the United States a much easier to obtain privilege. In the
United States there have been drastic and egregious price increases that have
been witnessed at every type of higher education institution, from community
colleges and state universities right up through the private Ivy League
institutions. (Graphs outlining the tuition increases in the United States can be
found in the appendix) In there lies the problems as the careers of the future
will require increasingly advanced levels of education. As can be seen in the
below graphs from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2010-2011
Occupational Outlook Handbook, the jobs which will experience the most
growth in the next 10 years will all require advanced education, the kind not
available on-the-job.
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In order to assuage this problem, the U.S. government must embark upon
a campaign for college affordabi
affordability.
lity. While some students may be able to
afford the net cost of $33,000 per year at Tulane University,, it seems like a
violation of the right to competition in an increasingly high-tech world when
the top 50 most expensive private schools, in terms of net cost to student, are
above or near the average annual income in the United States. As can be seen
in thee below chart, the net average cost of even a public four-year
year institution
represents
nts 73% of the average income of the lowest 20% of families. It is the
sad fact of a bygone era that members of American
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Net college costs* as a percent of family income
2005

% pts

Top-Bottom

(MU 2006)

increases

gaps

1992

At public four-year colleges and universities
Lowest 20% income families

57%

73%

16%

Middle 20%

17%

23%

5%

50% pts (1992)
64% pts (2005)
Highest 20%

7%

9%

1%

Lowest 20% income families

50%

58%

8%

Middle 20%

14%

17%

3%

At public two-year colleges

44% pts (1992)
51% pts (2005)
Highest 20%

6%

7%

1%

industry will never be able to find the same income level or benefits in the
jobs available today with the same low-education levels as was once possible.
In order to make U.S. citizens more competitive in the increasingly high-tech
and educated world, the costs of education must be corralled. While the
United States may have some of the highest levels of education in the
developed world, a workforce that has even higher levels of education will be
better able to bring the United States into a new era of development and
prosperity while allow it to embrace increased liberalized international trade.
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It seems clear that the easiest way that America can promote trade
liberalization and keep Americans employed and prosperous is to train people
and prepare them in a way which allows them to escape the negative effects of
international trade, such as what would be possible if educational attainment
was facilitated and cheaper.
Lastly, multinational corporations could go a long way toward
assuaging the trade concerns of liberalization if they committed themselves to
adopting corporate business policies which institute basic labor rights,
circumventing the delicate and difficult international political field. Labor
concerns in international trade have been an issue that has been discussed
through international governing bodies for much of the past half a century.
Most prominently, it emerged as part of the current Doha Round of trade
negotiations, and remains as one of the topics stalling international passage of
the round. However, many companies have been responding to the demands
of public opinion by instituting their own labor standards. There are a number
of basic practices which could be adopted with little real economic effect, but
drastic social implications both in Western markets and in the areas of
production.
Too many and too strong labor standards can be detrimental to the
workers, employers and growth of developing countries, instituting basic
standards could be beneficial for all three concerns. According to Kimberly
Elliot, the most common complaints in LDC workplaces are: dark, crowded,
hot and noisy workplaces; no emergency exists or fire extinguishers;
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inadequate or no restroom time; no place to eat; abusive supervisors; below
minimum wage payments; an absence of written contracts; compulsory
overtime; sexual or other harassment of workers; late-or short-wage payments.
Elliot follows by asking, “How expensive would it be to remedy some of these
problems? Providing emergency exit lights in a workplace or fire
extinguishers or giving workers security from sexual or other harassment or
the right to go to the toilet should be relatively inexpensive.”122 In terms of
aggregate costs, it would be hard to imagine that correcting these concerns
would represent a dire attack on the bottom lines of these companies. Spread
over the large production output that many of these companies exhibit, the
minor costs that are represented in these fixes would likely amount to little
more than a small budgetary line. In addition, many of these companies could
make up for these fixes through increased worker productivity and positive
public opinion which could serve to boost international appeal and sales.
Firms such as Nike and other manufactures have responded to public opinion
by enforcing minimal labor standards and have used the once negative
reaction to working conditions to their benefit, bearing witness to strong
growth in international sales.
Whether in terms of correcting simple labor concerns, creating a moreeducated society that is better able to adapt to a changing global environment
or building and managing an enhanced and more efficient TAA program, the
United States must commit itself to creating a situation where liberalization is
welcomed and not met with angry anti-globalists raining rocks and other
122
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projectiles on G20 security forces. Liberalized trade is beneficial to the
interests of the American public and to the country in general and thusly
should be assisted and promoted in whatever ways are possible.
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Appendix 1

1993 Fast Track Authorization
Final House Vote on H.R. 1876
June 22, 1993 2:19 PM
Bill Title:

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
150
145
295

Nays
23
102
1
126

Present

0

Not
Voting
3
10
0
13

Final Senate Vote on HR 1876
Vote Date: June 30, 1993, 06:36 PM
Bill Title:

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
37
39

Nays
4
12

Present

76

16

0

Not
Voting
3
5
8

NAFTA
Final House Vote on H R 3450
November 17, 1993 10:36 PM
Bill Title: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
132
102
234

Nays
43
156
1
200

Present

0

Not
Voting
0
0
0
0

Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R.3450
Vote Date: November 20, 1993, 07:28 PM
Bill Title: North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act
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Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
34
27

Nays
10
28

Present

61

38

0

Not
Voting
1
1

WTO Membership for the United States
Final House Vote on Passage of HR 5110
November,
29
1994
Bill Title: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
121
167
288

Nays
56
89
1
146

Present

Not
Voting

0

0

6:39

PM

Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 5110
December 1, 1994
6:48 PM
Measure Title: A bill to approve and implement the trade agreements concluded in the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
35
41

Nays
10
14

Present

Not
Voting

76

24

0

0

African Growth and Opportunities Act
Final House Vote on Passage on H R 434
July 16, 1999
2:19 PM
Title: African Growth and Opportunity Act

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
136
98
234

Nays
63
99
1
163

Present

0

Not
Voting
24
13
37
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Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 434
November 3, 1999
05:56 PM
Measure Title: An act to authorize a new trade and investment policy for sub-Sahara
Africa, expand trade benefits to the countries in the Caribbean Basin, renew the
generalized system of preferences, and reauthorize the trade adjustment assistance
programs.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
46
30

Nays
6
13

Present

76

19

0

Not
Voting
2
2
4

China Normal Trade Relations
Final House Vote on Passage of H R 4444
May 24, 2000
5:41 PM
Bill Title: To Authorize Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment (Normal Trade
Relations Treatment) to the People’s Republic of China

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
164
73
237

Nays
57
138
2
197

Present

Not
Voting
1

0

1

Final Senate Vote on Passage of HR 4444
September 19, 2000
02:21 PM
Bill Title: To authorize extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations
treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations
between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
45
38

Nays
8
7

Present

83

15

0

Not
Voting
2
2

2001 – 2002 Fast Track Authorization
Final House Vote on Passage of H R 3005
December
6,
2001
Bill Title: Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act

4:37

PM
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Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
194
21
215

Nays
23
189
2
214

Present

0

Not
Voting
4
1
5

Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 3005
May 23, 2002
8:13 PM
Bill Title: A bill to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade
benefits under that Act, and for other purposes.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
42
24

Nays
5
25

Present

66

30

0

Not
Voting
3
1
4

Andean Trade Preference Act
Final House Vote on H R 3009
July 27, 2002
3:30 AM
QUESTION: On Agreeing to the Conference Report
BILL TITLE: Andean Trade Preference Act

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
190
25
215

Nays
27
183
2
212

Present

0

Not
Voting
5
2
7

Final Senate Vote on H.R. 3009
August 1, 2002
04:18 PM
Bill Title: A bill to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade
benefits under that Act, and for other purposes.

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
44
20

Nays
5
29

Present

64

34

0

Not
Voting
1
1
2
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Chile FTA
Final House Vote on Passage of H.R.2738
July 24, 2003
Bill Title: United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
195
75
270

Nays
27
128
1
156

Present

0

Not
Voting
6
2
8

Final Senate Vote on Passage of H.R. 2738
July 31, 2003
09:22 PM
Bill Title: A bill to implement the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Totals

Yeas
43
22
65

Nays
7
24
1
32

Present

0

Not
Voting
1
2
3

3:47

PM
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Appendix 2
Net Tuition figures are complimentary of the Center for College
Affordability. Their findings are included below.
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Summary
There has been much talk over the past 50 years about the role of American labor
in a changing American industrial market. As the world has become increasingly
connected, American workers who tout high levels of labor rights, high wages, and safe
working conditions have been hard pressed to compete with emerging economies that
often share little of these same principles or legal decrees. Worker’s rights have become
an increasingly important topic for American labor. The debate over American
competitiveness in the world has been fought on the picket lines, on the streets, in back
rooms and most importantly in the stolid white columned halls of Congress. While
liberalized trade was widely supported within both Democratic and Republican
Congressional platforms in the post-war period, this stance has suffered from a slow
change, especially as the century came to a close.
Both sides of the debate are grounded and steadfast in their support or opposition
to a liberalized trade framework. Organized labor has progressed over the century from
supporting a liberalized trade platform when American manufacturing and blue-collar
jobs had a comparative advantage in an industrializing world, to demanding favorable
trade regulations when input and labor prices in the rest of the world began to undercut
American industries. Organized labor has also been quick to point out that the lack of a
global labor rights framework which has enforcement capabilities will precipitate into a
global race to the bottom where workers in the developed world will suffer wage cuts in
order to allow American industries to remain competitive. Unions point to the growing
productivity/wage gap as a sign that this problem is already diminishing the pay of the
American blue collar worker. They point to evidence from the Department of Labor and
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from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics that shows that there has been a large fall in relative
wages while the productivity of American workers has continuously increased, and ranks
nearly at the top of the most productive workers in the world. Unions also like to point
out that in nearly all major surveys conducted, consumers are willing to pay slightly more
for goods which were produced by American based manufacturers in order to guarantee
that they were created under fair and safe working conditions. Business groups take the
opposite stand (Some exceptions exist). Businesses support a liberalized trade platform so
that they have the freedom to put all potential cost saving and other business practices
into effect. American manufacturing sees accessing pools of cheap labor as a necessity to
compete in a globalized world where the mobility of capital is augmented by the mobility
of labor across many regions of the globe. They also point to the detrimental effects of
labor unions in the market; they show studies that unions have caused large negative
GDP effects since the 1950s. Businesses also make an argument against imposing labor
provisions on foreign countries, potentially not in the wishes of their workers or
governments.
The trade/labor debate has undergone a complete revolution over the last 40
years. In the post war years and even through the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations in
the 1960s, Democrats and their constituencies were fervently in favor of liberalized trade,
voting nearly unanimously in some cases to extend free trade privileges or reduce barriers
to trade. However, as the trade deficit emerged in the 1970s and American manufacturing
began a decline that would only quicken in pace, Democrats were forced by the industries
and labor unions that comprised a large part of their constituencies to support
protectionist measures. Democratic legislators helped to pass import restrictions and

133
content requirements which protected auto and textile companies against competition
from foreign producers. They even went so far as to pass trade restrictions against Japan
in an attempt to limit their suffering.
The trade debate took on the prominent role that it plays today with the NAFTA
debate in the early 1990s. The Business Roundtable, sponsored by the United States
Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers went head to
head with labor unions such as the AFL-CIO. President Clinton inherited the NAFTA
trade deal from former President George H.W. Bush, and was forced to work with the
Republicans in Congress to pass the deal as the majority of the Democrats remained
opposed. When he first came into office, President Clinton’s position on trade was
unknown and his early speeches and appointments did little to clear anything up. Clinton,
currying favor to the Democratic labor constituencies, argued for and won a side
agreement on labor that became a part of the agreement, although the lack of teeth in the
document left labor unions feeling betrayed and searching for answers.
The anger of the NAFTA debates would translate into the next decade, although
the Republican Revolution in 1996, which lasted until 2006, shut the Democrats out of
the trade debate. With the Democrats looking in from the outside, their loquacious allies,
organized labor, continued to pressure them to impose restrictions on trade to support
American manufacturing and blue-collar workers. During the Bush years, the United
States went through one of the most active periods of trade liberalization, although the
Jordan model did provide for an acknowledgement of the importance of labor rights.
However, it severely lacked the teeth or the requirements needed to be effective.
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Organized labor and the Democratic Party stormed back in 2006 and in 2008 as
the “Fair Trade” movement swept dozens of Fair Trade minded legislators, who have put
trade and specifically labor rights and standards back on the table, into office. However it
has become apparent that there is a discrepancy in the opinions of the old block
democratic leadership and the new arrivals. The Democratic leadership, including the
leaders of the trade committees, notably Sander Levin (D-MI) and other leaders such as
Nancy Pelosi have come out in support of liberal trade as long as labor has a place at the
table and sufficient labor concerns are taken into account. However, the newly elected
members of Congress widely supported a moratorium on trade liberalization and a
renegotiation of all previous trade agreements. The inauguration of a new Democratic
president, Barack Obama, was supposed to be a champion of labor standards and bring
forth a new era of trade negotiations. However with the state of the economy in full
freefall, trade was put on the back burner and with the Canadian NAFTA comment by an
Obama campaign insider to a Canadian official, it is unclear whether Obama will truly
push through the currently outstanding trade agreement which have been negotiated.
Significance
There remain surprisingly few comprehensive studies looking into the roles that
labor unions have played in shaping the trade policies of the United States. Looking at the
past elections provides enough evidence to show that the support of labor unions is not
only a welcomed element of Democratic campaigns, but a requirement. Trade policy for
many of these unions and companies in trade competitive sectors consists are highly
protectionist and this has clearly rubbed off on legislators. It is my hope that this research
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will go a long way into beginning to open up this debate and bring this significance to the
forefront of American politics.
Many Americans have not contemplated the policy implications of a single party
controlled government, whether that be protectionist Democrats or trade liberalist
Republicans In a completely Democratically controlled Congress and with a Democratic
president this could lead trade policy down a slippery slope toward protectionism at a
time when we should be embracing reducing trade barriers for American products. With
this report, it is my hope that Americans can support a balanced trade framework that
embraces a liberalized trade framework that also protects American and foreign workers.

